

STATINTL

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BOOK WORLD

Hard-Headed 'Cri de Coeur

THE CONDUCT AND MISCONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By Charles Yost

Random House, 234 pp. \$7.95

By CHALMERS M. ROBERTS

IT IS NOT just the Indochina war critics and the revisionist historians who are hacking away at the past and current conduct of American foreign policy. Now it is the establishment. First came the thunderous voice of Hamilton Fish Armstrong in his farewell to the establishment's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, with his cry of "isolated America." Now comes Charles Yost, a 40-year veteran of diplomatic service on three continents, finally as President Nixon's first ambassador to the United Nations, until 1971. Yost's volume is a *cri de coeur*, an outpouring of emotions long repressed by one so disciplined.

Yost is no revisionist; he might be called a modern establishmentarian. He is angry with much of the past, with the

"misconduct" of American foreign policy. But like many others he seeks to discern not only what went wrong—with the war the ultimate wrong—but what must be done in order, as Armstrong puts it, that "we may recover our self-confidence and self-respect and regain for our nation the standing in the world's estimation it once possessed." Yost, in fact, goes further: He seeks a prescription for the global conduct of international relations. Coming from an erudite man with long experience within the foreign policy establishment, what he says is well worth reading.

His "ultimate conclusion" is that the conduct of foreign affairs "cannot become rational until these affairs cease to be 'foreign.'" In turn, he examines how the American system has worked, and not worked, and the "radical and comprehensive action" he believes nations must take to avoid catastrophe in the nuclear age.

On the first point Yost turns out to be a traditionalist. There have been too many "amateurs in the White House," too many presidents playing at being

their own secretary of state. His current *bête noire* turns out to be Henry Kissinger and his "conceptual frameworks" for Metternichian balance-of-great-power diplomacy. He yearns for the strong secretary, Acheson, Marshall and Dulles. Yet his analysis deplores some of their major works: the Truman Doctrine's sweep, arms to Indochina, dependence on nuclear weaponry, over-fear of Russian intentions.

Yost deplores an American role as the world policeman, too much interference in the internal affairs of other nations by an overblown bureaucracy around the world. (He would cut State's personnel by 30 per cent or more, almost all of the cut here in Washington; send 75 per cent of the military attachés back home; and the CIA's "ham-handed hanky panky" and turn its intelligence operation, for the most part, back to State, and so on.) Most especially he would vastly lessen "the excessive participation of the U.S. military in foreign policy-making."

He sees no contradiction, evidently, between a desire to lower the American profile and his assertions that the United States should "push and drive" South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal "into the modern world while there is still time." And that the UN Security Council has a "solemn obligation," when its members can find agreement on a plan, to "impose a settlement" on the Arabs and Israel "or at the very least to impose measures which will ensure that armed conflict is not renewed."

Yost's "radical" ideas center on the United Nations. "Time no longer works in our favor," he writes. "The situation does not ripen; it rots." What to do, given the persistence of sovereign states, the nuclear arms race, population explosion and "the coexistence of affluence and misery" on our globe? First of all, the public and the publicists must have a quantum jump in their exposure to the "facts of life." (The media are encour-

aged to continue and increase their efforts to "pry loose from coy politicians and bureaucrats" all they can about foreign policy conduct.)

The democracies should draw closer together; nuclear arms should be sealed down (he gives us a listing); limits should be put on big power "competitive intrusions into the Third 'World'"; the UN should be a first, not a last, resort for American governments; U.S.-Soviet summit meetings should be held about once a year (Acheson and Dulles never agreed to that!); aid should be multi-lateral, and so on down a list many others have drawn for a better future. In essence, all steps that would "wither away" the concepts of "foreigner" and "foreign affairs" and replace them with "a sense of common kinship and citizenship."

Let these latter suggestions sound like Yost has taken off for the wild blue yonder, it should be said that all that he proposes is tempered with wisdom drawn from a lifetime of practical diplomacy. There are some fine vignettes, some righteous anger, plenty of down-to-earth suggestions. To the radical left Yost will seem only an unhappy old boy. To the stuffy right he will seem too critical. To some he will appear too much a traditionalist. To others he will seem naïve about presidents and the Congress. Yet without Charles Yost offers the reader some very hard-headed lessons from history and some sensible formulations on how to avoid the "misconduct of foreign affairs" in the next quarter century.

CHALMERS M. ROBERTS was, for 18 years, chief diplomatic correspondent for *The Washington Post*. His memoir, *First Rough Draft*, will be published in the spring.

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CHARLES BARTLETT

Tehran a Logical Post for Helms

It was probably not a merry Christmas for the Americanologists in the Kremlin who were kept at their desks by their masters' demand to know why President Nixon is sending his intelligence chief, Richard Helms, to be ambassador to Iran.

Intelligence is the nerve center of the Soviet system and the White House move will inevitably put the comrades into a spin. Their conjectures on Helms' reassignment are certain to be laced with conspiratorial intrigues and suspicions that Nixon has dark plans for deeper meddling near the under-belly of the Soviet Union.

The Muscovites would intelligently brush aside most of White House press secretary Ron Ziegler's explanation that Helms had asked to retire as CIA director because he was near his agency's retirement age of 60. Helms is a man who keeps fit with daily stints on an indoor track at the CIA and he is lean, healthy and young-minded enough to qualify easily for an exemption to stay at his job.

The Soviet experts also would be correct in brushing aside published speculation that Helms fell out of favor or disappointed the President with the quality of his performance as the government's chief intelligence officer. He has not always told the administration what it wanted to hear but his record of discretion—in the men he sent abroad, in his intelligence assessments and in his dealings

with Congress — is widely judged to have been remarkably solid.

Possibly his greatest feat has been to hold the confidence and credibility of Congress through a period in which the executive branch was faced with deep mistrust on foreign policy. It also was a time when the CIA's chief defenders on the Hill, dominating men like Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., and Rep. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., were passing from the scene.

Actually the agency gained respect in a period when it easily might have fallen victim to the popular mood because Helms held tautly to his professional role. Once he persuaded skeptics that he was not a man who would play partisan games, he was able to head off those senators who were bent on shrinking the CIA's cloak so they could have a better look at what was going on.

Ironically, the events which led to Helms' replacement were launched many months ago by James Schlesinger, the Rand analyst who has agreed, reportedly with great reluctance, to take Helms' job. As the Budget Bureau specialist on defense, Schlesinger was asked to study how the government's intelligence needs could be accomplished more economically.

This is not a small problem for a pinched government. Intelligence costs run about \$3.5 billion a year and the upward pressures on that spending level grow more intense as inflation bites into

the dollar. Schlesinger's study concluded that the director of central intelligence would have to reach out beyond his agency to perform budget surgery in the overlapping areas of Pentagon intelligence.

Helms was handed this task with an unreassuring fanfare at the White House. He declined to move his office into the Budget Bureau and held as closely as he could to his old activities as an intelligence officer. This was rational prudence because an abrupt move to chop the Pentagon's intelligence budget would stir many enemies and perhaps shatter the working alliance he had forged on the Hill. Some believe he decided to postpone any strong moves until the elections were over.

But the President, pinched by fiscal pressures, came to an impatient conclusion that the job will have to be done by a non-career man who will play the bull in the china shop more cheerfully. He turned to Schlesinger who is tough, savvy and disposed to seek his future outside of government, perhaps as a university head. He is taking a role that promises to be as bruising as any in government.

Very well, the Russians will say, but why Iran? The fact is there are few significant nations to which an ex-CIA director, even with Helms' charm, could go as ambassador without stirring mass protests. Iran is one and the Shah, reportedly delighted to draw an envoy who is close to the President, will be certain to insure that Helms is well received.

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The Change at CIA

There are such strict limits to what is knowable about the Central Intelligence Agency and its workings that any discussion of Mr. Helms' departure from the directorship and Mr. Schlesinger's appointment to replace him must necessarily rest on a comparatively small store of information. Even so, one or two things are plain. And chief among these is the fact, evident from what is known about the two men themselves, that one highly qualified and eminently capable official is being replaced by another.

Richard Helms has spent most of his professional life in intelligence work, and he has acquired a reputation among those qualified to judge, as a man of great honesty and tough-mindedness. The term "tough-minded" in this connection can only summon forth imaginary zither music for some people and visions of grown men running around endlessly shoving each other under trains. But Mr. Helms—unflappable, personally disinterested, and beyond the reach of political or ideological pressures where his judgment is concerned—earned his reputation for tough-mindedness in an intellectual sense. As Agency Director, he has been far less a public figure or celebrity than some of his predecessors—Allen Dulles, for example, or John McCone—evidently preferring to maintain a certain becoming obscurity. He has worked very effectively with some of his overseers on the Hill. And, if the leaked (not by CIA) material, such as the Pentagon Papers, that has been appearing in the press is any guide, he and his Agency have also served their executive branch leaders with some distinction. One gets the impression that from the presumed efficacy

of bombing the North Vietnamese to the presumed necessity of responding to every wild surmise of what the Russians were up to in nuclear weapons development, Mr. Helms has offered a practical, dispassionate and rigorously honest—if not always popular—view.

That the Congress will be pushing for some greater degree of responsiveness from the CIA in the coming session seems pretty certain. And there also is at least a chance that internal bureaucratic difficulties at the Agency will require some managerial rearrangements. In a way, solely because he comes to CIA from outside (not from up the ranks), James Schlesinger may be specially suited to take on both. But he has other qualifications. At the Rand Corporation in California, Mr. Schlesinger did analytic work that gave him more than a passing familiarity with the intelligence estimating business. At the Budget Bureau—as it was then known—in the early days of the Nixon administration he proved himself a very astute, not to say downright cold-eyed, scrutinizer of military budget requests. His brief term at the AEC was notable in several respects. Mr. Schlesinger bucked the pressure of the atomic energy establishment to insist that the AEC take note of and respond to the claims of its ecological critics. And he attempted to push the agency back from its political role toward the more disinterested service role it was meant in the first place to fulfill. He, like Mr. Helms, is demonstrably a man of talent, dedication and impressive intellect. We should have been content to see them stay on in their present jobs. But if Mr. Helms is to leave the Central Intelligence Agency, we think Mr. Schlesinger is a first class choice to replace him.

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CIA's Helms steps down

The United States has no long history of an integrated international intelligence service. Pretty largely, what we have today stems from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which was formed hastily in World War II, and from which the present Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) evolved.

The CIA passed through many reorganizations and alterations of course under several directors during its early years. It's had its share of brickbats and bouquets.

In recent years, however, the CIA appears to have settled down. It is now, by and large, a highly respected member of the international intelligence community, at home and abroad.

Much of the credit for this is due to the work of Richard Helms, who is now leaving the post of director for the exotic climes of Teheran where he will be the United States ambassador to Iran.

Helms himself has a record of experience in intelligence work that is second to few, if any, living Americans. As a young naval officer he was drafted into the OSS, and then stayed on with the CIA in various jobs of increasing delicacy and responsibility,

leading to his appointment as director in 1966.

Some time ago, Helms said no man should rank high in the CIA after age 60. Now he's about to be 60 himself — reason enough to leave.

There has been talk that he disagreed with President Nixon on a vital matter involving an evaluation of Russia's "first strike" missile capabilities or intentions. However, no matter what the facts may be in that instance, Helms leaves the CIA after a long career of effective and honorable service to the nation. We hope he will enjoy Teheran — and get a bit of rest from the arduous, round-the-clock labors of spy-master extraordinary.

Meanwhile, Helms' successor will be James R. Schlesinger, whose most recent post has been as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Schlesinger, 43, has held various other important jobs in Government, and is a man who has a reputation for infinitely detailed planning and for keeping those plans to himself until they're mature. Seems pretty appropriate for his new duties at CIA.

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A Thoughtful Analysis of U.S. Policy

By Lauren Soth

Editor of The Register and Tribune Editorial Pages

CHARLES YOST served 35 years in the United States Foreign Service. He was ambassador to Laos, Syria and Morocco, and was deputy and later permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations. He filled many important posts for the State Department during World War II and the postwar years.

Today he is a lecturer in foreign policy at the Columbia University School of International Affairs and writes a syndicated newspaper column, which appears frequently in The Register. Mr. Yost has broad and deep experience in foreign affairs and the advantage of being eye-witness to many crucial events in the crucial last third of the century. Moreover, he can write.

This combination has produced an excellent new book, "The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs" (Random House). It is a superior account of foreign affairs and analysis of U.S. policy, written for the general reader. It should be a good book for high school study, as well as for general reading by the public.

Criticizes Three Administrations

As would be expected from a career diplomat, the author makes a strong argument for careful, methodical, professional, expert spadework in foreign affairs. He tends to be suspicious of presidents who fancy themselves as their own secretaries of state. He deplores foreign policy management by White House advisers and the National Security Council, which displaces the traditional role of the State Department and the secretary of State.

Yost does not attribute all mistakes in U.S. foreign policy, as he sees them, to this pattern of making and administering foreign policy. Nor does he conclude that America has had the wisest possible foreign policy under traditional State Department management.

However, he sharply criticizes foreign policy design and execution during the last three administrations, of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. All three, he writes, had little respect for the career Foreign

Service. They built up separate directorates of foreign affairs in the White House, "headed by men of outstanding ability but without the depth and breadth of experience in the foreign field which might have saved them from some of the blunders into which they stumbled — Indochina being the most significant."

Mistakes on Military Advice

Yost thinks Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all made serious errors in foreign policy because of their inability to put military advice into perspective as President Eisenhower could. The last three presidents also have been less willing to insist on the prerogatives of the State Department than President Truman and President Eisenhower were.

Although Yost dissents in many ways from the policies of both Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of State, and John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's, he thinks the machinery for conduct of foreign policy was in good order in those administrations. "Whatever one may think of his policies, under [the Eisenhower] Administration, the U.S. government spoke with a single, firm, clear voice abroad."

One of the biggest problems in U.S. foreign policy in the last three administrations, in Yost's view, is the weight of the military in making policy. Yost thinks the U.S. has far too many military missions abroad and thinks U.S. embassies are overstuffed with military officers. In some cases, he feels, they outweigh the civilian diplomats in representing the U.S. abroad. He says the work they perform in many posts is trivial, and he concludes that three-quarters of them are superfluous and should be sent promptly home.

Would Cut CIA Work

Yost believes that undercover work in the conduct of foreign affairs has been carried to absurd and unnecessary lengths. He would sharply reduce the Central Intelligence Agency missions abroad, including all the "James Bond" stuff. He thinks that only a tiny amount of significant intelligence is gained by spying and believes that most of the

important information gained by both the State Department and CIA is through careful analysis of newspapers, radio programs and other public information around the world.

Orbiting satellites do a far better job of collecting the really important "secret" information about military installations and movements, particularly nuclear weapon deployment.

This reviewer liked particularly what Yost had to say about the news media in relation to foreign policy.

"... In an area of government where the executive is so predominant, where it is so intermittently responsive to Congress and public opinion, and where its weakness for secrecy is so easily carried to ridiculous extremes," he writes, "the role of the news media in informing, alerting and inciting public opinion is absolutely critical. All presidents and some vice-presidents complain bitterly about the role of a free press, but the electorate should only complain that there is not enough of it."

Believes In U.N.

Yost thinks that far too many government documents are "classified" and kept from public view. "Seventy per cent of the political and economic information which is classified confidential or secret, much even that is classified top secret or higher, could be published without serious benefit to foreign governments or more than temporary embarrassment to our own."

Yost applauds the moves by President Nixon to establish better relations with Russia and China. He says hostile competition with the Communist great powers would be capable of generating an ultimate disaster. He does not conclude, however, that a "concert" of two, three or five great powers is capable of stage-managing the world. He believes that the United Nations, with further development of regional organizations, is the indispensable machinery for peaceful world order.

Continued

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What Really Happens Out There at

By FRANK VAN RIPER
OF THE NEWS Washington Bureau

THE SIGN outside the entrance to the heavily wooded compound in suburban Langley, Va., says, "Bureau of Public Roads," but it's an open secret that what goes on beyond those gates has little to do with roads and even less to do with the public.

Behind the electronically monitored fences and constantly manned guard shacks is the Central Intelligence Agency. In recent months, the secrecy, size and capabilities of the nation's chief spy shop have been questioned by men who have been there, former agents themselves.

One of them, Patrick J. McGarvey, a 14-year veteran of the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, contends that the amorphous "intelligence community" has grown so unwieldy, so redundant, in the last 10 years that the U.S. is now getting an intelligence product that is actually inferior to what it got a decade ago with fewer men and fewer machines.

And all this with the benign neglect of Congress which, McGarvey says, has approved the CIA's big annual budget request behind closed doors, with little inclination or desire to question the spending estimates of the agency's leaders, including CIA Director Richard M. Helms. Helms' planned departure from the CIA after six years, first revealed by THE NEWS last month, was seen in some quarters as an indication of White House concern over the size of the intelligence bureaucracy.

In an interview, McGarvey, a 37-year-old father of four who spends his spare time writing poetry and fiction and dreaming of one day owning an oyster boat in Chesapeake Bay, maintained that in the area of U.S. intelligence, "we're being deluged with much more information than we actually need."

The author of the recently published book, "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," McGarvey declared that "back in

the Spy Factory?

the U-2 days, just before the satellites came into being, we were getting a goodly amount of solid intelligence from the biggies—the Soviets and the Chinese—enough that we could digest it properly, enough that it received the kind of critical acclaim within the intelligence community that it deserved.

"But today, for example, we have so many satellites pumping pictures back to us on a daily basis that nobody pays a damn bit of attention to them."

"Seventy to eighty per cent of the money now spent on intelligence is spent in technical collection, satellites and such, and it's ridiculously expensive and ludicrously redundant," McGarvey said. "The Army overflies all of Latin America taking pictures, and doesn't show them to the Air Force. The Army is interested in roads and ports and the whole schmier, while the Air Force is only interested in radar sites, missile sites and air fields, harbors, and that's about it. Each of

these guys is doing the same damn thing, and each individual budget has got a justification for it."

Several lawmakers, among them Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, have been skeptical of U.S. intelligence-gathering, especially in light of such glaring failures as the 1968 Pueblo affair — which McGarvey says was unnecessary and could have been avoided—the abortive Son Tay prison camp raid in November, 1970, when U.S. forces wound up raiding an empty North Vietnamese barracks in search of American PWs and the 1969 shootdown of a Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea.

"One can almost predict," McGarvey said, "an increasing number of intelligence failures on the scale of the Pueblo incident—and perhaps another war—because of the present dry rot that infects our national intelligence structure."

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Debriefing the press: 'Exclusive to the CIA'

by William Worthly

In April 1961, a few days after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at that time the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, met in off-the-record session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors at their annual convention.

Given the Cuba intelligence, by then obviously faulty, that had entered into Washington's rosy advance calculations, he inevitably was pressed to tell: "Just what are the sources of the CIA's information about other countries?"

One source, Dulles replied, was U. S. foreign correspondents who are "debriefed" by the CIA on their return home. The usual practice is to hole up in a hotel room for several days of intense interrogation.

Much of the debriefing, I've learned over the years, is agreed to freely and willingly by individual newsmen untroubled by the world's image of them as spies. In

at least one case, as admitted to me by the Latin-American specialist on one of our mass-circulation weekly newsmagazines, the debriefing took place very reluctantly after his initial refusal to cooperate was vetoed by his superiors. But depending on the particular foreign crises or obsessions at the moment, some of the eager sessions with the CIA debriefers bring handsome remuneration. Anyone recently returned from the corrupted Philippines can probably name his price.

Despite its great power and its general unaccountability, the CIA dreads exposes. Perhaps because of a "prickly rebel" family reputation stretching over three generations, the CIA has never approached me about any of the 48 countries I have visited, including four (China, Hungary, Cuba, and North Vietnam) that had been placed off-limits by the State Department. But the secret agency showed intense interest in my travels to those "verboten" lands. In fact in those dark days, Eric Sevareid once told me that Allen Dulles, the intelligence

gatherer, differed with brother Foster Dulles, the Calvinist diplomat about the wisdom of the self-defeating travel bans.

Years later, I learned that the U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest who twice came to my hotel to demand (unsuccessfully) my passport as I transited Hungary en route home from China in 1957 was, in fact, a CIA agent operating under a Foreign Service cover. During a subsequent lecture tour, I met socially in Kansas City a man who had served his Army tour of duty in mufti, on detached service in North Africa and elsewhere with the National Security Agency. Out of curiosity I asked him what would be the "premium" price for a newsmen's debriefing on out-of-bounds China. He thought for a moment and then replied: "Oh, about \$10,000." Out of the CIA's petty cash drawer.

My first awareness of the CIA's special use of minority-group newsmen abroad came at the time of the 1955 Afro-Asian summit conference at Bandung, Indonesia. Through Washington sources (including Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post Dispatch), Cliff Maekay, then editor of the Baltimore Afro-American, discovered—and told me—that the government was planning to send at least one black correspondent to "cover" the historic gathering.

The "conduit" for the expense money and "fee" was the director

of a "moderate" New York-based national organization, supported by many big corporations, that has long worked against employment discrimination. The CIA cash was passed to the organization's director by a highly placed Eisenhower administration official overseeing Latin-American affairs who later became governor of a populous Middle Atlantic state, and whose brothers and family foundation have long been heavy contributors to the job opportunity organization.

Because of the serious implications for a press supposedly free of governmental ties, I relayed this information to the American Civil Liberties Union. I also told Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip Randolph's union associates in the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's re-

memory: "I'm one step ahead of you, Bill. President Sukarno and the Indonesian government know all about this, and they are particularly incensed at having a man of color sent to spy in their country."

Cold-war readiness to "cooperate" with spy agencies, whether motivated by quick and easy money (I've often wondered if under-the-counter CIA payments have to be reported on income tax returns!) or spurred by a misperceived patriotism, had its precedent in World War I and in the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary aftermath. In the summer of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his wife, and Charles Merz published in the New Republic an exhaustive survey of how the New York Times had reported the first two years of the Russian revolution. They found that on 91 occasions—an average of twice a week—Times dispatches out of Riga, Latvia, buttressed by editorials, had "informed" readers that the revolution had either collapsed or was about to collapse, while at the same time constituting a "mortal menace" to non-Communist Europe. Lippmann and his associates attributed the misleading coverage to a number of factors. Especially cited in the survey were the transcending win-the-war and anti-Bolshevik passions of Times personnel, as well as "undue intimacy" with Western intelligence agencies.

After 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power after having ousted the corrupt pro-American Batista regime, Miami became a modern-day Riga: a wild rumor factory from where Castro's "death" and imminent overthrow were repeatedly reported for several years. Both in that city of expatriates and also in Havana, "undue intimacy" with the CIA caused most North American reporters covering the Cuban revolution to echo and to parrot official U. S. optimism about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In the summer of 1961, on my fourth visit to that revolutionary island, a Ministry of Telecommunications official told me of a not untypical incident shortly before the invasion. Through mercenaries and through thoroughly discredited Batistianos, the CIA was masterminding extensive sabotage inside Cuba—a policy doomed to failure not only because anti-Castro endeavors lacked a popular base, but also because kindergartens, department stores during shopping hours, and similar public places bombed. In no country does one mobilize mass support by killing

children in their classrooms and women where they shop.

On one such occasion a bomb went off at 9.08 p. m. Five minutes earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitious U. S. wire-service correspondent filed an "urgent press" dispatch from the Western Union teleprinter in his bureau office, reporting the explosion that, awkwardly for him, came five minutes after the CIA's scheduled time. When that correspondent and most of his U. S. colleagues were locked up for a week or two during the CIA-directed Bay of Pigs invasion and were then expelled, many U. S. editorial writers were predictably indignant.

Except perhaps in Washington itself and in the United Nations delegates' lounge, the CIA's department on journalism is probably busier abroad than with newsmen at home. In 1961, during a televised interview, Walter Lippmann referred casually to the CIA's bribing of foreign newsmen (editors as well as the working press), especially at the time of critical elections. All over the world governments and political leaders, in power and in opposition, can usually name their journalistic compatriots who are known to be or strongly suspected of being on the CIA's bountiful payroll. I believe it was Leon Trotsky who once observed that anyone who engages in in-

telligence work is always uncovered sooner or later.

Even neutralist countries learned to become distrustful of U. S. newsmen. In early 1967, Prince Norodom Sihanouk expelled a black reporter after just 24 hours. In an official statement the Ministry of Information alleged that he "is known to be not only a journalist but also an agent of the CIA." In a number of Afro-Asian countries, entry visas for U. S. correspondents, particularly if on a first visit, can be approved only by the prime minister or other high official.

As recently as a generation ago it would have been unthinkable for most U. S. editors, publishers, newscasters, and reporters to acquiesce in intelligence debriefings, not to mention less "passive" operations. What Edward R. Murrow denounced as the cold-war concept of press and universality as instruments of foreign policy had not yet spread over the land. In the years before the Second World War, if any government agent had dared to solicit the cooperation of a William Allen

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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business as usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

(Italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions . . ." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would

STATINT

to Kennedy of letting operations be conducted by those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted on a united operation, arguing that separation would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many arguments on both sides and the issue deserves continuing consideration.

In particular, there is something to be said for deciding now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). This would otherwise tend to institutionalize the notion that CIA itself is run by the organizers of clandestine activities rather than by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed, there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing in outsiders to manage CIA.

The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget also deserves re-examination. It is being argued, in a citizen suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other departments because the Constitution provides, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. (italics added)

Not only the CIA expenditures but the distorted budget reports of other agencies would seem to violate this provision. The petitioners call for a functional breakdown, showing general categories of uses of CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing where funds have been spent.

Certainly, there is little justification for hiding the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public and the Congress. This figure reveals less to any potential enemy than the size of the Defense Department budget—which we freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure would make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency budgets. This would stop an authorization and appropriation procedure which systematically and perennially misleads Congress and the public.

Problems Posed by Clandestine Political Operations Abroad

CIA's four divisions concern themselves with Support, Science and Technology, Intelligence, and Plans. Press reports suggest that the personnel in these divisions number, respectively, 6,000, 4,000, 2,000 and 6,000.

The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data and prepares economic, social, and political reports on situations.

It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissel and, after 1962, Richard Helms—now the Director of the CIA itself.

Does the CIA Pressure Presidents?

The most dramatic clandestine operations obviously have the approval of the President. But as any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas that are deeply felt.

The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations—both under the guidance of Richard Bissel—reveal this phenomenon. In both cases, the President (first Eisenhower, then Kennedy) went along with the plan reluctantly. In both cases, the operation

CIA-RDP80-01601R000100070001-6 recalled saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? They would say It hasn't happened yet,

But it was obvious that it would happen eventually. Indeed, two years after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed military estimate that Russian rockets could hit U-2s at 68,000 feet. And it was known that these U-2s could flare out. At what point would CIA itself have had the self-control to stop the flights?

Are the Repercussions Worth It?

We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights, though it was of much less direct significance to our security and tranquility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet missiles other than test vehicles. But the information was too secret to be used even though it was known to the Russians. At home, missile gap was still a popular fear based on pen and paper calculations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions or direct knowledge." Eventually, the flights destroyed a

SPIRIT OF OSS LIVES ON

"The CIA," writes OSS veteran Francis Miller, "inherited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous preoccupation with action and the Bay of Pigs was one of the results of that legacy." CIA men, like their OSS predecessors, have been imaginative, free-wheeling, aggressive, and often more politically knowledgeable than their State Department colleagues. And, like the men of Donovan's organization, CIA "spooks" abroad still resist headquarters "interference in their activities."

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 362.

hopeful summit conference in 1960 and thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was CIA's greatest clandestine success!

In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the disaster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocates and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration had given the plan a go-ahead from which disengagement would be embarrassing. Once the invasion started, they pressed for more American involvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, ludicrously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba, intelligence about the likelihood of the necessary uprising was far too optimistic.

This failure had repercussions as well. It left the President feeling insecure and afraid that the Soviets thought him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. Some believe that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as too weak.

Clandestine political operations obviously have far-reaching political consequences no one can predict.

Is the Burden of Secrecy too Great?

The CIA recently brought suit against Victor Marchetti, a former employee, for not submitting to them for clearance a work of fiction about spying operations. It is evident that the CIA does not like to have its clandestine operations or methods. The result was a "prior restraint"

order without precedent in which Marshall forbade from publishing anything about CIA, fiction or not, without letting CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against the traditional freedom of American press and publishing is now in the courts as a direct result of Government efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot be discussed at home. This is a clear example of the statement written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."

Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped World?

For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large institutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed world. In the developed free world, the stability of Governments now makes political operations unnecessary. In the Communist developed world, these political operations are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively unsuccessful.

The penetration of CIA by the Soviet spy, Philby, is said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"—that effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949 which cost the lives of 300 men.

The only really important clandestine Soviet source of information known publicly was Pankofsky. The public literature really shows only one other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with spies: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern European sources. Allen Dulles, on television, called this "one of the main coups of the time I was [at CIA]."

Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdeveloped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The Governments are relatively unstable and the societies provide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to justify.

We are not at war—usually, not even at cold war—with the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they rarely if ever pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a struggle between the forces of dark and light—a struggle in which we must influence every corner of the globe.

In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms recently said:

"America's intelligence assets (sic), however, do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United States, as a world power, either is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers."

Thus, where the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power."

Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If information were all that were at issue, a strong case could be made for getting needed information when you need it through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance.

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If massive political manipulation is at issue, then one requires long-standing penetration of institutions of all kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant information necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.

Political Control of Agents in the Field

Because political operations are so sensitive and, potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another—no matter how distasteful—CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get information. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movement. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the movement that the United States likes it, or might support it.

Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are correctly interpreting U.S. policy—or what they think it should be—in delicate maneuvers which they control.

What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possible" to help if a coup were mounted. (See Philadelphia Inquirer, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")

No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy will be insensitive to the problems to which these situations give rise. These problems would be dramatically diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information gathering and were known to be. The movements would then cease to look to CIA for policy signals.

Alternative Controls on CIA

What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative possibilities:

1. Prohibit CIA operations and agents from the underdeveloped world: This would have the advantage of pro-

AGENTS LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION

Writing after the war of his negotiations for the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, Dulles cautiously suggested: "An intelligence officer in the field is supposed to keep his home office informed of what he is doing. That is quite true, but with some reservations, as he may overdo it. If, for example, he tells too much or asks too often for instructions, he is likely to get some he doesn't relish, and what is worse, he may well find headquarters trying to take over the whole conduct of the operation. Only a man on the spot can really pass judgment on the details as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles added, "It has always amazed me how desk personnel thousands of miles away seem to acquire wisdom and special knowledge about local field conditions which they assume goes deeper than that available to the man on the spot." Almost without exception, Dulles and other OSS operators feared the burden of a high-level decision that might cramp their freedom of action.

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 9.

protecting America's reputation—and that of its citizens doing business there—from the constant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with information that the underdeveloped world could be collected by State Department

officials through embassies. The policy would now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the Nations involved.

Arguments against this policy include these: the area is too important to U.S. interests to permit such withdrawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.

2. *Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world only for information, not manipulation:* This policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation for non-interference in the affairs of other countries. One might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe Ransom that secret political operations could be used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security.

Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing information could secretly try to influence events. But there is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose and for the other.

Also, large scale operations would not be conducted under this rule. According to some reports, the Committee, chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode, recommended to President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to operations requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than side arms—weapons which could be carried by individuals.

3. *Require that relevant representatives of Congress be consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those required for intelligence collection, are undertaken:* It is an unresolved dispute, between the Executive and Legislative Branches, whether and when the Executive Branch may undertake operations affecting U.S. foreign policy without consulting Congress. If a clandestine political operation is important enough to take the always high risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult Congress. These consultations can produce a new perspective on the problem—which can be all important. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was one of the few who predicted accurately the political consequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.

4. *Require that the ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monitor compliance with Congressional oversight:* Under the Kennedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he knew at least as much as did they about local covert activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their region. In all these cases, political oversight and political perspective would be injected into operations that would otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view.

Improper Use of Force

One morally and politically important imperative seems clear: Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or torture. There are repeated reports that no such rule does not exist. There was the murder by a green beret,

The CIA has been accused of assassination of "Vietcong agents"—many of which, it is reported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent], it becomes necessary 'to get everything out of them and we do it with no holds barred.'"

There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA:

"The director would come back from the White House and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very upset about _____. We agreed that the only solution was _____. But of course that's impossible, we can't be responsible for a thing like that.'"

"The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and _____ and nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)

Problems of Clandestine Domestic Operations

After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing the National Student Association, a variety of front organizations and conduits were unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organizations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported individuals. The organizations included National Education Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation, and many others.

The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion apparently characteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, while distinguished participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of its magazine, *Encounter*, evidently believed that the organizations were doing only what came naturally, the CIA official who set the entire covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way:

"We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of *Encounter*. The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if the needed money could be obtained from 'American foundations'?" (Saturday Evening Post 5 / 20 / 1967 *Speaking Out*, page 2)

President Johnson appointed a panel headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel members were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between CIA and those "educational and private voluntary organizations" which operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play their proper and vital role." The Panel recommendations were as follows:

1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.

continued

While the institutional forms of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking.

Even when the control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which CIA information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs.

Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it was intended to be.

—The New York Times, April 25, 1966

2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities or organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

On March 29, 1967, President Johnson said he accepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to implement it fully. He said he would give "serious consideration" to point 2 but apparently never implemented it.

When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold war." Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue despite the regulations.

At least one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for this approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called "Establishment." For example, when the National Student Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now defunct, Look Magazine, were so incensed at general expressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in thirty years(1) defending the students. In such an atmosphere one must expect liberal (much less conservative) foundations and banks to cooperate whole-heartedly with the CIA whatever the cover.

In any case, what could such deeper cover be? In the first place, commercial establishments or profit-making organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is possible also that organizations which seemed to be voluntary were actually incorporated in such a way as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include enriching individuals by throwing business their way and having these

individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.

To the extent that these arrangements, though voluntary organizations, they pose the same problems which created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by President Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. Moreover, in the coming generation, we can expect a continuation of the existing trend toward whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known.

easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of CIA's predecessor—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—becomes head of the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Department Intelligence becomes President of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed "studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies of elections as the Director of the American Political Science Association).

Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipulation, may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the Republican campaign for President, a memorandum went out to Republican college organizers which urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the election.

This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secretaries and acquaintances—questions that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in America. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)

As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisticated college graduates will not be willing to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten American values.

One method, in the American tradition, for keeping CIA honest would be a public-interest organization of alumni of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the Government). This public interest group would, as do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress on matters of interest to it—in this case, intelligence. The testimony might be given in public or in executive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions and criticisms could be made.

Such an organization would have a credibility and authority that no other group can have and a general knowledge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in this organization, or communicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, associated with classified information. The Federation of American Scientists' strategic weapons committee is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy by which a group of persons, well grounded in strategic arms problems can, without violating any rules concerning such information, make informed and useful policy pronouncements. Many persons consulted in the preparation of this newsletter endorsed this suggestion.

CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?

There are still sensitive, progressive men in the CIA, but they are becoming scarcer by the moment. The Agency's career trainees no longer come from the Phi Beta ranks of Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The Agency is widely regarded on college campuses as the principal symbol of all that is wrong with our nation. "For the world as a whole," wrote Arnold Toynbee recently, "the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it." Millions of college students and young professionals, the future "power elite" of the United States, would accept that judgment.

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 382.

In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do not wish to be tarnished by association with it. In one country, it is reported, CIA put funds into the bank deposits of a political party without its knowledge. But what if this were discovered? Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by trying to help them secretly.

TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE**Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):**

The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates in the late fifties that they were removed in 1961 from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and replaced by a new supervisory organization: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the Defense Department's intelligence resources and analyses. Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become rivals and competitors; apparently, this has become the case.

By 1964, DIA had merged the intelligence publications of the armed services into publications of its own: launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's "Central Intelligence Bulletin"; supplanted J-2, the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the services in providing "order of battle" information and had basically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw intelligence.

A number of informed observers have nevertheless suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others, with Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way to prevent the military services from having intelligence branches and—that being the case—DIA is necessary to sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case, in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normally disinterested analysis, DIA and the intelligence services pose real questions of redundancy, waste, service bias and inefficiency.

Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress are convinced that there is such waste in Defense Department Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee reported:

The committee feels that the intelligence operation of the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual needs of the Department and is now receiving an inordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department. Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence operations. The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations. Coordination is less effective than it should be. More material is collected than is essential. Material is col-

lected which cannot be evaluated in a reasonable length of time and is therefore wasted. New intelligence means have become available, and have been incorporated into the program without offsetting reductions in old procedures.

In July, 1970, the Panel Chairman of the Blue Ribbon

MIR. SYMINGTON. As a longtime member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as an ad hoc member of the Appropriations Committee and the ranking member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead with my colleagues to allow me to receive in executive session enough intelligence information to in turn form an intelligent judgment on matters which so vitally affect our security; and so I can vote in committee and on the floor of the Senate on the basis of the facts. There have been several cases where we have not been able to do that in the past. In my opinion, this lack of disseminated information has cost the country a great deal of treasure and a number of American lives.

— from *Congressional Record-Senate*
November 23, 1971, S-19529

Report on Defense Department problems Gilbert Fitzhugh told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentagon suffers from too much intelligence. They can't use what they get because there is so much collected. It would almost be better that they didn't have it because it's difficult to find out what's important." He went on to suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail work, and too little looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen year range.

National Security Agency (NSA):

In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the National Security Agency as a separate agency inside the Defense Department. NSA's basic duties are to break codes of other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, and to perform intelligence functions with regard to electronic and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees. Today, it is thought to have 15,000 and a budget well over a billion.

In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former employee of NSA wrote a long memoir for *Ramparts Magazine*. The article summarized the author's claims by saying:

"... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane; the numbers on the side of each plane, the name of the pilot in command; the precise longitude and latitude of every nuclear submarine; the whereabouts of nearly every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missile base; every army division, battalion and company—its weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely the NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and commercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tactical Air, and KGB forces. (It was the NSA that found Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communications intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologic experts seek to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkable success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated signals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and manual morse radio transmissions. Interception of Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to gauge quite precisely the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units. Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" every human voice used in radio transmissions and distinguish them from the voice of every other operator. The Agency's Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) are capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitted anywhere in the world and, from an analysis of the intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and physically reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown the superfluous to point out that NSA monitors and records

every trans-Atlantic telephone call."

A July 1971 **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100070001-6** extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of many of [the article's] revelations." Experts had denied, however, the plausibility of the assertion that the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. □

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In each House of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittee members are secret. In the Senate, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee form a

WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE?

We are going to have to take a harder look at intelligence requirements, because they drive the intelligence process. In so doing they create demands for resources. There is a tendency for requirements—once stated—to acquire immortality.

One requirements question we will ask ourselves is whether we should maintain a world-wide data base, collected in advance, as insurance against the contingency that we may need some of this data in a particular situation. Much of this information can be acquired on very short notice by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world. We haven't enough resources to cover everything, and the high priority missions have first call on what we do have.

—Hon. Robert F. Fröchlke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 9, 1971 before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, House of Representatives.

subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has not met for at least two years—although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellender—then the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war in Laos—surely CIA's biggest operation. (Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521/S19530.)

The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even to know about intelligence operations. Without publicity, and public support, there is a limit to their influence over the events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities.

Approximately 150 resolutions have been offered in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.

Two more recent efforts, both sponsored by Senator Stuart Symington, have tried different tacks. One resolution called for a Select Committee on the Coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad; such a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the U.S. intelligence expenditures of all kinds to \$4 billion.

Senator Clifford Case (Rep., N.J.) has sought to control the CIA by **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100070001-6** "agency of the U.S. Government." These resolutions em-

body existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circumventing for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily designed agency, which Congress empowered, and which Congress can control.

Congress has not only given the Executive Branch a blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government . . ." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "government" is concerned, this has not been done. On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out an amendment (S. 2224) to the National Security Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports" the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of both Houses and to make special reports in response to their requests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. □

Dad was even able to joke about serious things. One of his proudest accomplishments as President was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Before it was established, intelligence was gathered by a half dozen agencies, and very little of it reached the President. One day he sent the following memorandum to Admiral Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the first CIA chief:

To My Brethren and Fellow Doghouse Denizens:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Top Dog I require and charge that Front Admiral William D. Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, receive and accept the vestments and appurtenances of their respective positions, namely as personal snooper and as director of centralized snooping. . . . I charge that each of you not only seek to better our foreign relations through more intensive snooping but also keep me informed constantly of the movements and actions of the other, for without such coordination there can be no order and no aura of mutual trust.

H.S.T.

This refusal to let the seriousness of his work make him solemn was typical not only of Dad but of the men around him. Matt Connelly was one of the great all-time teasers. He loved to hang ridiculous nicknames on people and would solemnly introduce "Corporal" Vaughan and "Field Marshall" Canfil to befuddled visitors. Bill Hassett was known as the "Bishop" because he was a solemn, scholarly Catholic.

In a letter to his mother in September, 1946, Dad gives a good picture of the way the boys relaxed by tormenting each other:

Some Hearst columnist by the name of Tucker had called Harry Vaughan a fat, lazy major general who ought to be a corporal and they really made Vaughan believe that Tucker was right. I really felt sorry for both Vaughan and Graham [who was kidded for answering nut mail] before the raggers let up on them.

Dad played a delightful joke on Dr. Graham early in September, 1946. Here is how he described it to his mother:

Made Doc Graham a brigadier general yesterday and nearly embarrassed him to death. I told him to come to the morning

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TINTL

THE WHITE HOUSE PLAN TO PRUNE THE GOVERNMENT

Now the re-elected President is moving on domestic problems. Ahead: efforts to overhaul Government, bring the budget under control, cut down on bureaucracy and avoid tax hikes.



—Crockett in "Washington Star-News"

"JUST WORKING ON MY GOVERNMENT-REORGANIZATION PLAN."

With a new mandate from the voters—but a Congress still controlled by the political opposition—President Nixon intends to press for far-reaching reforms in Government agencies and programs during his second term.

The President has said:

"I honestly believe that Government in Washington is too big, and it is too expensive. We can do the job better with fewer people."

On the outcome of this effort may depend the burden of federal taxes, the impact of inflation on the cost of living, the value of the American dollar, and the availability of money and credit for business expansion.

Action agenda. In the fortnight immediately following his re-election, President Nixon took these actions:

- Signaled a firm determination to shake up the organization of the executive branch of Government from the White House on down.
- Called for resignations of about 2,000 presidential appointees, including Cabinet officers and White House aides. Many will be retained. Some will be shifted to new jobs. Others will be dropped.
- Conferred with top advisers including Vice President Spiro T. Agnew at Key Biscayne, Fla., or Camp David, Md., on plans for Administration personnel, policies and programs in the new term. Mr. Agnew has been the President's liaison man with Governors, mayors and local officials around the country.
- Recalled Roy L. Ash, president of Litton Industries and former head of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, to assist in the structural planning.
- Consulted John B. Connally, former Texas Governor who led the Democrats-for-Nixon drive in the recent campaign. Mr. Connally was a key member of the Ash Council, before serving as Treasury Secretary in the first Nixon term.
- Set December 15 as a target date for announcing personnel and policy decisions in overhaul of the Government.

Associates say the President will be

guided by recommendations of the Ash Council, which conducted a two-year study of Government operations in 1969-1970.

The advisory group submitted about 16 separate reports. Many remain confidential memoranda for the President. Others were published at the time Mr. Nixon first called for wholesale Government reorganization in his 1971 state-of-the-union message.

"Most Americans fed up." The President said then that "most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels."

The Ash Council found that the Government has grown up in a topsy-turvy fashion, adding people and programs without any consistent pattern, and with a great deal of overlapping and duplication among agencies.

As a result, Mr. Nixon told Congress in January, 1972, "Our Federal Government today is too often a sluggish and unresponsive institution, unable to deliver a dollar's worth of service for a dollar's worth of taxes."

Here are major reforms proposed by the Ash Council, as revised by the White House in the last two years:

New super-Departments. A half dozen Departments of Cabinet rank and a score of lesser agencies would be consolidated into four new super-Departments along modern, functional lines.

A White House documentary on the subject said that "the executive branch should be organized around major purposes of Government."

The new super-Departments would deal with domestic problems in these areas: human resources, natural resources, community development and economic affairs.

Programs dealing with people—such as education, welfare, health, manpower training, social security and unemployment insurance—would come under a Human Resources Department.

Other programs—those dealing with urban renewal, rural development, city planning, hospital construction, mass-transit systems and urban highways—

would be assigned to a Department of Community Development.

A Natural Resources Department would guide land use, soil conservation, energy sources and minerals, water resources and marine technology, public works, recreation and civilian atomic energy.

Under an Economic Affairs Department would come many existing functions of the Commerce, Labor and Transportation Departments, along with the Tariff Commission and Small Business Administration.

The Agriculture Department would be retained as a separate entity, but would be limited to dealing with farm-commodity production and marketing programs. Its present operations are much broader.

These Federal Departments would be abolished: Interior; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation.



Originally, the Ash Council proposed to leave intact the existing Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice.

Recently, President Nixon reportedly has been focusing on shaking up the State Department, leading to specula-

FEDERAL PAYROLL UNDER NIXON

DOWN IN EMPLOYEES

UP IN SPENDING IN DOLLARS



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tion that Mr. Connally may become the next Secretary of State.

Objective: give the foreign service a new mission of looking out for economic interests of the United States around the world in an era of increasingly tough trade competition.

At Key Biscayne on November 11, Deputy White House Press Secretary Gerald Warren said that "a great deal of staff work" has gone into plans for remodeling the foreign-policy apparatus.

Officials point out that a number of Government units have varying roles in foreign affairs, including the Treasury, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture Departments; Export-Import Bank; National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and many others.

President Nixon would like to achieve better co-ordination, particularly as it affects U. S. interests in world trade, monetary and economic affairs.

The "fourth branch." The White House distributed in 1971—without recommendations—an Ash Council report on federal regulatory commissions.

Terming them a "fourth branch of Government," investigators found these commissions "are not sufficiently accountable for their actions to either Congress or the President." The report suggested that they should be "more responsive to the public interest."

There are at least eight of these quasi-judicial bodies, with broad authority to regulate private enterprise.

The Ash Council proposed that six of

them be abolished, with their functions redefined and assigned to new agencies. The six:

Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Power Commission.

New agencies to be created: Transportation Regulatory Agency, Federal Power Agency, Securities and Exchange Agency, Federal Trade Practices Agency and a Federal Antitrust Board.

The Ash Council also recommended that the Federal Communications Commission be reduced from seven to five commissioners.

No public recommendation was made—at least, none was published—concerning operations of the National Labor Relations Board.

The White House took the position that it was circulating the report for consideration and comment by interested parties, subject to later action.

However, informed sources say that the emphasis on Government reforms now being considered by Mr. Nixon does not appear to lie in the regulatory area.

Changes by Congress. Some changes proposed by the Ash Council and other advisory bodies have been enacted by Congress. For example:

A new Environmental Protection Agency was created to deal with air, water and noise pollution across the board.

The Budget Bureau was recast as a modern Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President.

Also approved were a new Domestic Council and an International Economic Policy Council at the White House.

The Post Office Department was reformed as a Government corporation known as the U. S. Postal Service.

A new corporation was set up to take over at Government expense the money-losing passenger operations of certain railroads, under the trade name of AMTRAK.

But the major proposals of the President for Government reforms were ignored by the Democratic-controlled Congress during the last two years.

Now, Mr. Nixon says he has decided "to accomplish as much as I can of that reorganization through executive action."

Presidential powers. Opinions vary on how much the President can do without the consent of Congress.

One authority expressed this view:

"You can't abolish or create executive departments without the consent of Congress. You probably can't merge some operating programs without congressional approval.

"There are, however, a lot of internal structural changes within Departments and agencies that could be done by executive orders of the President."

Another official claimed the President has considerable latitude to merge or

consolidate domestic programs, and to spend or withhold funds. He also pointed out that the President possesses a veto power over legislation.

Nevertheless, it is expected that renewed requests will be made to Congress for substantive legislation to accomplish major reforms in the structure of executive departments.

Otherwise, the President may set up supervisors in the White House to keep watch on operations of the bureaucracy in the lower echelons of Government.

Call to "revolution." White House officials emphasize that Government reorganization is an integral part of a much broader package of reforms presented to Congress in the 1971 state-of-the-union message.

Mr. Nixon called for "a new American Revolution" to "return power to the people" through federal revenue sharing with States and localities, decentralization of the federal bureaucracy, and elimination or consolidation of a host of narrow-purpose grant-in-aid programs that require matching money from local sponsors.

A fiscal expert pointed out that the Federal Government has more than 1,000 aid programs, costing taxpayers more than 40 billion dollars a year. "We have more than 100 programs in the field of education alone," he added.

In a special message to Congress in 1971, President Nixon said:

"At the federal level alone, we have spent some 1.1 trillion dollars on domestic programs over the last 25 years, but we have not realized a fair return on this investment.

"The more we spend, the more it seems we need to spend, and while our bills are getting bigger, our problems are getting worse."

Among the controversial programs are welfare, medicaid, legal services for the poor, community-action groups, manpower training, model cities, public housing, rent supplements, and "compensatory education."

Some Departments where the President feels that a "bloated" bureaucracy has failed to deliver services are these: Health, Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; Labor, and Transportation.

Revenue sharing. Shortly before the November 7 election—after three years of debate—Congress authorized a five-year general revenue-sharing plan.

Funds are to be sent from Washington to States and localities to help meet local needs, with no strings attached, except that the federal money cannot be used to raise the pay of local officials.

Now the Administration wants to get rid of a lot of aid programs of narrow purpose that have not worked to solve social problems, but help keep a massive federal bureaucracy in office, with re-

quirements for fed-aid and matching contributions on the part of State and local sponsors.

The money would be converted into special revenue sharing, or block grants of funds, which political subdivisions could use as local needs require, in six broad areas of government.

Those areas would be: urban development, rural development, education, manpower training, law enforcement and transportation.

Above all the President is determined to try to get control of "built-in" escalators and so-called uncontrollable costs of Government to keep the federal budget from skyrocketing beyond the means of the taxpayers in future years.

Caspar W. Weinberger, director of the Office of Management and Budget, said:

"I think the President feels, first of all, that we need procedural changes, particularly in Congress, to get hold of the budget and spending process, which at the moment seems to be badly out of control.

"The President also feels that there should be a lot more decision making at the local level, and less reliance on an all-powerful Federal Government."

Outlook. The effort to reorganize the Government, revise social-welfare programs and bring federal taxing and spending under control is likely to be the battleground for a continuing struggle between Congress and the Administration in the Nixon second term.

24 NOV 1972

Helms at Camp David***It's Time to Look
At the CIA*****By Stephen S. Rosenfeld**

MR. HELMS, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was publicly summoned to Camp David this week to participate in what the White House terms its "major" reassessment of the American foreign policy structure. If his summons indicates that the United States' large secret intelligence establishment is to undergo the same Executive scrutiny being accorded the agencies which operate more in the public eye, then this is welcome and important news.

Before saying more, I should perhaps state that I am not one of those journalists with a close discreet working relationship with the CIA; for purposes of this article I requested an on-the-record interview with Helms or his chosen representative and did not receive one.

It would seem self-evident, however, that as the United States moves from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, from a time when Russia and Communism were widely perceived as terribly menacing to a time when both the country and the ideology are increasingly regarded as adequately neighborly, then the role of the CIA has got to be reviewed.

Now, obviously a great nation must have a professional intelligence service. The imperatives of defense, not to say elementary prudence, demand it. A case can even be made that a certain kind of technological intelligence is more essential in a period of incipient detente—in order to supply policy makers and their publics with the assurance they need in order to enter into new agreements with old adversaries.

THE SALT-I agreement apparently is unique in granting explicitly each side's right to lob intelligence satellites over the other's territory to count missiles, tests and so on. Presumably satellites would be similarly useful in verifying and in nourishing public confidence in any shifts made as a result of the forthcoming European force reduction talks. In all cease-fire situations, Mideast, Indochina or what-have-you, intelligence can be vital.

In at least two areas, however, intelligence needs review: for "dirty tricks" and for its secrecy.

The act of 1947 setting up the CIA specified that, in addition to intelligence duties, it was to perform "such other functions" as the National Security Council might direct. A "plans division" was set up in 1951. Most CIA directors, including Helms, have come up through Plans. The group seems to have been active, and conspicuously so, through the 1950s, toppling uncooperative governments, harassing wayward Communists, etc. The whole atmosphere was permissive:

Bond books who let the Plans Division organize Cuban exiles (and a few Americans) to invade at the Bay of Pigs.

deputy director for Plans, an old Helms man, operates on a much tighter leash (doing no more, it is said, than the Republicans are alleged to have done to the Democrats); that the old problems of policy control and separation of intelligence from operations are in hand; that the small and weak countries which once were the CIA's playgrounds are no longer so vulnerable to its deeds.

At the same time, one hears that the President's old anti-Communist juices have not altogether stopped fermenting and that he receives and is responsive to reports that the Russians still play some pretty rotten tricks and, by golly, we ought to show them they can't do that to us and get away with it.

WHATEVER THE TRUTH, I would submit that the time is ripe for the Congress to review the dirty-tricks mandate it gave to the CIA a quarter-century ago as the cold war was beginning to dominate the American outlook on the world. It is inconsistent, at the least, that the State Department should now be zeroing in on measures to combat "international terrorism" while the CIA retains a capacity to practice certain forms of it. Cuba's continuing lack of love for the CIA, restated in its bid for hijacking talks last week, underscores the point.

Secrecy is something else. No one who accepts the need for intelligence would argue that the whole process and products should be made public. But no one concerned with the health of democracy can accept that condition with equanimity. The general sense of being at war with communism since World War II has produced a far more secretive government than we would want or tolerate in other times. With that sense of being at war danger fading, the rationale or spur for secrecy diminishes accordingly. There is further the claim that the secrecy surrounding the CIA may have undermined the larger job of conducting a wise policy, i.e., one well discussed and debated.

This is the principal basis on which Senator Cooper earlier this year proposed that the relevant act be amended to give the foreign relations and defense committees of both houses access to the information and analysis obtained by the CIA—exactly as the Atomic Energy Commission has given such secret material for decades to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Predictably, the President objected. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the proposed amendment; the Armed Services Committee, otherwise preoccupied, did not act on it. Cooper is retiring but Senator Symington, who has his own sense of the need to assert the Congress' foreign policy responsibilities and his own record of concern for improving congressional oversight of the CIA, may be prepared to receive the torch. He's No. 2 on Armed Services, too.

The CIA is out of the news these days. It usually gets into the news only when it fouls up. But a lot more about its place in the new bureaucratic and international scheme of things ought to be known. Whether the CIA's activities are all essential and whether they are all organized efficiently are questions not want to leave to a Chief Executive nudgling privately out in the woods at Camp David.

STATINTL

The Central Intelligence Agency:

A Short History to Mid-1963
STATINTL

James Hepburn

STATINTL

"I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . ."

— Harry Truman, President of the U.S.
quoted at the start of the chapter

Introductory Note by the Editor

The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1968 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. James Hepburn is a pseudonym; the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Americans what actually happened in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that I know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, for ways to purchase the book.) The twenty chapters are absorbingly interesting.

Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, I have seen no demonstration that any of the information contained in the book is false — and the information does tie in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90% of what is in the book is true.

The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America".

Everywhere — and the United States is no exception — there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.

Hired Killers

Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.

Fanatic Assassins

The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.¹ The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.

Professional Soldier Assassins

Today, professional soldiers and guerilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.

The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's aides, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac".

Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler

The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.² Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT³, under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.

But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the basement of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.

Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of operation, incendiary bombs would have been more effective. The Germans have used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German

continued

Crises in western intelligence agencies

As this Service has more than once pointed out, correct strategic appreciations cannot be made without correct intelligence information. Inaccurate or distorted intelligence can falsify strategic decisions and bring about situations of great danger.

At present, there is something seriously wrong with the western intelligence services—something perilously wrong—and this Service believes it necessary to report this without reserve.

The following very important report comes from one of our American observers who has 26 years' active experience in the intelligence field. He says that various western intelligence agencies are now at the lowest ebb of their efficiency and that the near future prospects appear even bleaker. At a time when both Russia and China are facing serious internal crises, we are failing to exploit this situation. Indeed, we are actually helping them to tighten their grip on their own people and satellites and we tolerate their operation of tools of destruction within the Free World.

Our observer reports:

Gradual erosion of efficiency

A dangerous situation exists in many western intelligence agencies in the fields of strategy and security. This has led to numerous faulty decisions and policy trends by top-ranking Free World political leaders.

Many of these decisions and policy trends, based on incorrect intelligence interpretation or on "disinformation" or deception deliberately sown by the enemy, are now endangering the continued existence of Nato, Cento and Seato, as well as weakening the Free World's psychological will to resist further Soviet or Chinese inroads.

This situation is not a sudden development, but rather the result of gradual erosion of intelligence efficiency in the West due to improper intelligence leadership and guidance, the deliberate planting in strategic intelligence agencies of key personnel who are sympathetic to what they have been led to believe are the Soviet and Chinese objectives (disguised under the term "Communism").

Patient planning

There has been a patient planting of long-range Communist penetration agents within western intelligence agencies, the crossing over of numerous western intelligence agents, and a carefully prepared deception plan of disinformation designed by the Soviet leadership and exercised by the KGB to guide western leaders into courses of action which are favourable to the Soviet Union.

The signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, massive shipments of Free World arms to the Soviet Union, the Soviet economy and thus bolster up the dictatorship, the promotion of ever-

increasing friendship with Peking at the expense of long-term allies, the steady export of western industrial and technical know-how to the Soviet Union, the lack of American resolution and the protracted blundering in Vietnam and numerous other concessions to Moscow and Peking—these are a few indications of long-term intelligence failures and deficiencies which have now reached a crisis stage.

The following agency-by-agency examination will highlight some of the present problems.

The CIA

Formed in 1947, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) inherited a number of personnel and policy weaknesses from its World War II counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Communist penetration of the OSS is a matter of public and historical record. Many of its tainted personnel found a ready-made home in the new CIA.

In the early 1950s the CIA brought into its ranks many political refugees from the U.S. State Department and other areas who were forced or frightened out by anti-Communist investigations.

At the same time, Communists and Communist sympathisers were known to have penetrated American military intelligence and the Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC)—a matter of intimate knowledge reported at the time by your correspondent. A proposed investigation was called off.

Dubious CIA personalities

Upon being appointed Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles allowed the introduction of such personalities as William Sloane Coffin (later Chaplain of Yale University and a New Left co-defendant with Dr. Benjamin Spock in the recent draft conspiracy trial), Thomas Braden, Cord Meyer, Jr., and numerous others with far-left orientations.

At that time, CIA Board of National Estimates member William Bundy and a number of other CIA officials contributed to the legal defence fund of Soviet agent Alger Hiss. Thomas Braden was appointed head of the CIA International Organisation Division and his assistant was Cord Meyer, Jr.

Braden believed in "fighting" Communism with Socialism and consequently the CIA financed a number of domestic and foreign far-left organisations to counter Moscow's international front groups.

In the long run this policy proved to be a dismal failure and was largely responsible for the emergence of the New Left upon the political scene. Long-standing Communist organisations were ignored by the CIA and many Socialist groups were strengthened by money.

Cord Meyer

Present talk in top CIA and DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency) circles indicates that Dr. Henry Kissinger, national security adviser to President Nixon, is urging the appointment of Cord Meyer, Jr., to replace CIA

Director Richard Helms upon the latter's requirement.

It may be of interest to *Intelligence Digest* readers to know that Meyer was a founder of the Communist-penetrated American Veterans' Committee (AVC) and later served as President of the one-world United World Federalists (UWF). Both the AVC and the UWF were subjects of lengthy FBI and other security agency investigations. Both were found to be Communist-penetrated and influenced. Your correspondent personally took part in some of these investigations.

Many blunders

Upon the resignation of Thomas Braden from the CIA in 1954, Cord Meyer, Jr., took over the International Organisation Division and then became head of the CIA's Covert Action branch. He is now a top leader in the CIA and, if Dr. Kissinger has his way, he may replace Helms as CIA Director.

It must be pointed out that when Meyer departed from the UWF he highly recommended his close friend Alan Cranston to head that left-wing group. Cranston had earlier worked with Carlos A. Prato, listed by the New York police as "the pay-off man for the Soviet secret police". Prato was earlier expelled from Switzerland as a Comintern agent.¹

With leadership of this kind it is small wonder that the CIA has been responsible for so many intelligence blunders and bad policy recommendations such as the Bay of Pigs, the murder of President Diem of South Vietnam, the present fiasco in Vietnam, and other major incidents.

It must be pointed out that many concerned officials are wondering whether these blunders have been by accident or by deliberate design or policy sabotage. The Soviet KGB (INU) has been carrying out a deliberate campaign over the years to penetrate various western intelligence agencies and has been highly successful. The CIA should have a thorough-going investigation by the FBI.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

Morale has fallen among the veteran members of the FBI since the appointment of Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III to replace the late J. Edgar Hoover. Currently, Gray is conducting a major purge of the regional leaders of the FBI's 1,200 special agents.

Discipline has become lax. Hoover's personal file on security

¹See the report "California: the cap on the red" in *Intelligence Digest*.

suspects within the CIA has disappeared. Needed information for the version and Communist control of the American peace movement has not been made public by the FBI. A serious weakness in the dissemination of subversive and counter-espionage intelligence by the FBI has grown greater.

The W. German BND

Except perhaps for the CIA and the FBI, probably no other western intelligence agency has been so weakened as has the West German *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND—Federal Intelligence Service) since the retirement of General Reinhard Gehlen on April 30, 1968.

With the appointment of Lieut.-General Gerhard Wessel as BND President, with headquarters at Pullach, outside Munich, that agency has suffered extremely heavy set-backs which have never been made public—especially during the last two years.

The British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) has come to refer to the BND as "Brandt's news-desk". Practically every one of the BND's staff workers at Pullach is known by name and is card-indexed and cross-filed at KGB headquarters in Moscow and Karlshorst. The same applies to the 2,400 BND employees working at 100 out-stations in various parts of Germany.

About 9,000 BND agents and contacts working behind the Iron Curtain and in the Middle East, Africa and the Far East (particularly Indonesia) have recently been compromised to the KGB in what is perhaps the highest Soviet intelligence success in the last three decades.

Details of each of the carefully covered and disguised BND out-stations have been revealed to the KGB. BND sources in Russia and the Warsaw Pact countries have not only been compromised and destroyed but many of those which are still functioning have been crossed-over or turned around to work for the Soviet Union as double agents in feeding false information as part of a gigantic deception plan.

One may well ask what happened?

What happened?

The BND was formed on April 1, 1956, with the transfer of the Gehlen organisation to the West German Government with General Gehlen as President. Before this, the Gehlen organisation worked for the CIA from July 1, 1949. From July 12, 1946, it worked for the United States Army G-2, particularly the U.S. Seventh Army G-2 (intelligence).

The predecessor of what came to be known as the Gehlen organisation started working for U.S. Army G-2 in March, 1946, under Lt.-Colonel Herman Baun—a former *Abwehr* officer who worked with Gehlen during World War II in the FHO (*Fremde Heere Ost*—Foreign Armies East—of the *Wehrmacht*).

From April 1, 1942, to April 9, 1945, Gehlen headed the FHO, which was the most effective military intelligence organisation working against the

Soviet Union. Dismissed by Hitler in 1941, Lt.-Colonel Gerhard Wessel, the same person who relieved him 23 years later as BND President.

Before the end of World War II, Gehlen carefully laid plans for working against the Soviet Union under the aegis of the Americans. After some initial delay, his plan was carried out. Remnants of the FHO became the framework of the new Gehlen organisation.

Compromised by Social Democrats

Both the BND and the Gehlen organisation scored notable intelligence successes and also some severe set-backs due to Soviet counter-measures. The major and more recent problems, however, appeared after Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats gained power in Bonn and instigated an appeasement policy towards Moscow and East Berlin.

Before this, Gehlen and the BND knew that Brandt and some of his close associates were having secret meetings with known Communists.

After Brandt became Chancellor, he forced BND President Wessel to accept three Social Democrats into key positions, using Chancellery Minister Horst Ehmke as the middleman. These appointments were as follows: Dieter Blotz as BND vice-President (the number 2 spot in the BND); Dr. Richard Meier as head of BND Department I (Acquisition—the most important and sensitive department within the BND); and Herbert Rieck as head of BND Department IV (Central Services).

All three were Social Democrat Party appointments and all three men are essentially pro-Marxist.

BND vice-President Blotz, with absolutely no intelligence background, formerly ran the Hamburg office of the Social Democrat Party. Meier and Rieck are now staffing their respective departments with Social Democrat political appointees.

As a result of all this, the complete BND organisation is known to have been compromised to the Soviet Union by various Social Democrats—either by design or lack of security, or both.

The fact is that both the CIA and the SIS know that the clandestine arm of the BND operating behind the Iron Curtain has been compromised and destroyed or crossed-over by the KGB.

BND Department I

It is important to know the functions of the BND departments run by Meier and Rieck.

Under the BND reorganisation plan initiated by Gerhard Wessel, Department I (Acquisition) has the following subdivisions: East Germany; the Soviet Union; Poland; Czechoslovakia; the remainder of the Warsaw Pact countries; the Middle East; the Far East (including China and Indonesia); Africa; Latin America; western Europe; southern Europe; northern Europe; and

Department I also operates the 100 and maintains legal BND residents in western countries and many non-aligned countries. It also has liaison with the American CIA, the British SIS and the French SDECE (*Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage*).

Department I also maintains liaison with the West German BfV (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*—Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which handles internal security) and MAD (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*—the military security service for the West German *Bundeswehr*).

One can see that Dr. Richard Meier and his politically appointed subordinates hold a very sensitive position. During recent months, the CIA, SIS and SDECE have been very careful with regard to the information they have given to BND Department I.

BND Department IV

BND Department II handles technical matters, including communications intelligence or radio interception service. It is currently headed by Heinz Buchardt, who is considered to be both experienced and trustworthy.

Department III, headed by Robert Borehardt, handles evaluation and prepares various intelligence papers for dissemination.

BND Department IV, headed by Social Democrat Herbert Rieck, is highly sensitive and is responsible for BND central services. Its subdivisions include the following: Finance; Legal; Administration; Organisation; Personnel; Training; Security; Responsibilities; Courier Service (between departments and with allied agencies); Publicity and Press Liaison; and Central Documentation Library.

These four departments have offices at the Pullach headquarters and are visited almost daily by BND vice-President (and Social Democrat Party wardheeler) Dieter Blotz.

Reorganisation needed

A BND reorganisation is desperately needed to oust the left-wing political element from its ranks and to repair the vast damage already done. Not only is the BND in a state of crisis as a result of Brandt's policies, but so is the entire *Bundeswehr*—the West German armed forces.

General Wessel plans to retire on December 24, 1973, on reaching his 60th birthday. If Brandt is still in power after the elections Wessel will in all probability be replaced by Dieter Blotz.

Wessel is a professional intelligence officer with high standards. But he allowed himself to be compromised by Brandt and the Social Democrats.

The British MI-5

Attempts have been made to penetrate both the British SIS and the French SDECE by the KGB. The SDECE has openly admitted the existence of Russian KGB or GRU agents in its organisation and is doing its utmost to ferret them out.

MI-5 (the British intelligence organisation) has been doing generally a good job and in September, 1971, was

¹Except in part by this Service. See the report "The German espionage scandal" in the January, 1969, issue of *Intelligence*

Desks in each subdivision handle military, political, economic, armaments, technical and counter-espionage.

responsible for the ousting from Britain of 175 Soviet officials for espionage.

Despite this, however, there is a clear danger of infiltration.

Sir Martin Furnival-Jones, who retired last May as head of MI-5, recently warned of continued Soviet espionage probes—especially those aimed at politicians. In testimony given before the Franks Commission reviewing the Official Secrets Act, he stated that politicians and journalists were prime targets for Soviet agents. In a more specific comment he stated:

"I can certainly say that many Members of Parliament are in contact with very many intelligence officers. No doubt many Members of Parliament, many people, enter the House of Commons in the hope of becoming Ministers. If the Russian intelligence service can recruit a Member of Parliament, and he continues to hold his seat for a number of years and climbs the ladder to a ministerial position, it is obvious the spy is home and dry."

Sir Martin stands opposed to the revision of the Official Secrets Act.

The situation in MI-5 may not be at crisis level, but its key personnel do not want any more legal loopholes through which Soviet agents can escape.

The situation in general

In the past there have been various intelligence scandals and blunders, but today they are more abundant than ever before and have affected almost every western intelligence agency. Years of effort by the KGB and its satellite agencies to penetrate and deceive western intelligence are now bearing fruit.

The Free World is not only lowering its guard but appears determined to help in its own destruction.

BREMERTON, WASH.

SUN

OCT 27 1972

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FBI Role In Crime Fight Told

"Criminals are no longer professionals -- we have a new breed of amateurs," Thomas Manning, senior resident agent in Longview, told a gathering of Bremerton Kiwanis Club members yesterday.

Manning, who has been with the FBI 14 years, said that there are, also, "organized gangs in nearly every type of illegal activity" in New York City, where he has worked.

"These people know this is a very quick way of getting a fast dollar," he said.

In the past 10 years, he continued, there has been a 147 per cent increase in crimes of violence. Local police agencies, he said, deserve support in efforts to fight crime.

In an attempt to fight crime, a prototype computer is being developed with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) whereby fingerprints could be submitted to a scanning device to get identification from a centralized computer bank.

"This is very close to reality," he told the gathering, which included Edwin Schlie, Bremerton's chief of police.

"We're also in the process of getting all states to participate in a criminal history program," Manning said.

"We're not a national police force," he said, but an investigative arm of the Department of Justice. The FBI operates within the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), outside the country, he continued.

"It's not that we're secretive," he asserted. "We play our cards close to the vest because of the type of work we do."

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.
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M - 81,277

The 'secret' stampers get some new rules

By Richard Hollander
Scripps-Howard Newspapers

Along with a myriad of other matters, the Department of Defense is presently engaged in trying to digest the contents of a weighty tome which lays down regulations "governing the classification, downgrading, declassification and safeguarding of classified information," stemming, no doubt, from the dust-up over the leaking of the "Pentagon Papers" some months ago.

Like so many examples of military and civilian gobbledegook produced by all governments at all levels, this particular effort could only have been written by recent honor students in the graduate school of obfuscation at mud-died waters state teachers college.

However, and fortunately, military and civilian bureaucrats seem to be able to understand each other, even though few of the rest of us do, and it's to be hoped that the new regulations covering security of documents and equipment will make more sense than sometimes has been true in the past.

National security controls as they were learned, perforce, long ago by older, more sophisticated nations, are relatively new to us. Even as recently as in the months before Pearl Harbor we were naive by comparison.

It was then, for instance, in that hot summer of 1941, when Hitler's forces were sprawled fatly across most of Europe, and Britain stood alone, trying to fashion a continuing military miracle out of the escape from Dunkirk, that a small, new American agency was set up in Washington by order of President Roosevelt.

Its responsibilities were somewhat masked by its innocuous title: Office of the Co-ordinator of Information (COI). Mostly, though, it was called "the Donovan Office" after its chief, Col. (later major general) William J. (Wild

Bill) Donovan. From it eventually stemmed two war-time agencies, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information (OWI). And from these emerged two post-war agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Information Agency (USIA).

Well, the COI had a security officer. In addition to seeing to it that all black-gloved young ladies who wanted to become secret agents, a la Mata Hari of World War I, signed their names before entering the offices, he ordered that each document, paper, etc., delivered to the agency be stamped with a classification.

"Secret" meant that the material, if it were to fall into the wrong hands, might endanger the life of the nation. "Confidential" meant that the material might endanger U. S. interests. "Restricted" meant that the information should not be given to the general public.

The security officer's order was followed to the letter. One of my proudest possessions dating from that time -- since thrown out with other memorabilia of by-gone days -- was a copy of the Washington Evening Star newspaper red-stamped "restricted."

Thus, even so long ago, inflation had hit the classification business. "Restricted" lost whatever value it might have had, and it no longer appears in the Pentagon lexicon.

As World War II progressed, "confidential" became pretty thin gruel and even "secret" wasn't anything to lose much sleep over. It was superseded, first by "very secret," then "top secret," and, later, "most secret." Later still came "eyes only" which meant that the message should be

shown only to the high-ranking person to whom it was addressed, apparently overlooking the fact that the person who showed it to him had already seen it.

Finally, in the months before Normandy D-Day, there was a special classification working on invasion plans. For reasons that are shrouded in the mists of the past, this was called "bigot." Before sitting down to a meeting on, say, the projected distribution of toilet paper to liberated Frenchmen in the neighborhood of Cherbourg, people asked each other the somewhat incriminating question:

"Are you bigoted?"

In those simpler times, it was a proud thing to be able to say yes. You proved it by showing a card that had been run off a mimeograph machine.

As history will attest, D-Day was an eminently successful operation, and our side won the war in spite of everything.

The new Pentagon regulations recognize only "confidential," "secret," and "top secret." Fortunately, the literal-mindedness of the COI's security officer in 1941 is sternly interdicted in the new Chapter IV, Section I, Paragraph R-102, titled "Exception," which states categorically:

"No article which, in whole or in part, has appeared in newspapers, magazines or elsewhere in the public domain, nor any copy thereof, which is being reviewed and evaluated by any component of the Department of Defense to compare its content with official information which is being safeguarded in the Department of Defense by security classification, may be marked on its face with any security classification, control or other kind of restrictive marking. The results of the review and evaluation shall be separate from the article in question."

At last the comic pages are home free.

the British, laid the largest minefield in history to keep German submarines from traversing the North Sea.

Between the world wars a quest for permanent peace was sought through the limitations of armaments. War again came in 1939, and with the collapse of France, the tempo of U.S. preparedness increased. Then inevitably, as in 1917, the United States was drawn into the conflict. The country was engaged in a massive shipbuilding program when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, but there was a desperate need for more of everything. The requirement to provide convoys, transport men and materials, and actively engage the enemy strained our resources. As ships and aircraft became available the country went on the offensive, German U-boats in the Atlantic changed from the hunter to the hunted. The inevitable collapse of Germany began with the Normandy invasion. Over 2,000 ships and craft joined our Allies in the movement to the beaches of Western Europe.

In the Pacific, vast distances gave the war a different complexion. Japanese carriers and surface ships led their advance into the South. In May 1942, at the Battle of the Coral Sea, Japanese naval expansion was checked and in the following month a superior enemy fleet was decisively beaten at the Battle of Midway. Japan was now on the defensive. The Navy carried American marines and soldiers through all of the amphibious campaigns of the Pacific from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. With the Japanese surrender onboard U.S.S. *Misouri* in Tokyo Harbor, September 2, 1945, victory was achieved. However, events soon would show that it was an uneasy peace.

Suddenly war erupted in Korea. Fortunately the United States had control of the seas from the outset. As bitter fighting raged on the Pusan perimeter, a bold offensive began with the amphibious assault at Inchon. The Communist armies that had been on the verge of winning at Pusan collapsed. In the ensuing ebb and flow of the war, the Navy continued its role of moving supplies, providing naval gunfire, and carrier air support.

U.S.S. *Nautilus* heralded the era of naval nuclear power in 1955. In 1960, *Triton* completed a submerged cruise around the world. In 1960, the Navy commissioned U.S.S. *George Washington*, the first of 41 Polaris-missile submarines. Nuclear propulsion also plays an increasing role in the surface Navy—the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, cruiser *Long Beach*, and the missile frigates *Bainbridge* and *Truxtun*.

Since 1964, the U.S. Navy has been engaged in the conflict in Southeast Asia, and has carried out its mission with distinction, helping our Nation fulfill a solemn pledge to the people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

And so on this day, as we pause to honor the U.S. Navy, I ask this august body to join in saluting a naval heritage rich in tradition and achievement, dedicated to our Nation's security and to those principles and ideals which have made our Nation the great haven of the free world.

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, before this Congress adjourns it is fitting that we pay our respects to the senior Senator from Kentucky, who is voluntarily retiring from the Senate.

I use the word "retiring" advisedly. Seldom have I served with one as modest and self-effacing as our colleague. And this is a body not noted for such characteristics.

Senator Cooper came to the Senate a little after I did, so I have known him throughout his Senate career. In fact, he is the only colleague who, during his temporary break in service when he was our Ambassador to India, sat across the table from us in the Foreign Relations Committee, as an executive branch spokesman. In 1967 he joined us on the Senate side of the table.

During these last 6 years, Senator Cooper enriched the committee with his diligence, conscientious participation, and farsighted proposals. While he has always been consistently discreet about his role and experiences as Ambassador, I am sure that this added to the insights he brought to committee discussions.

I can only speculate whether it was these experiences that led him to sponsor the amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 (S. 2224) which would serve to keep Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the CIA, together with its analysis. This is an example of Senator Cooper's knack of laying bare the essentials of a problem and proposing a sound solution.

His legislative achievements are many and have been amply attested to by my colleagues. I will limit my recollection to two illustrations of his areas of concern.

His name will be long recalled as the Cooper of the series of Cooper-Church amendments which, over the years, have sought to limit our military involvement in Southeast Asia. The first of these amendments, in 1969, to the Defense Department appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. By a similar Cooper-Church amendment to the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, this prohibition was extended to Cambodia as well. In 1971, the committee reported a Foreign Assistance Act containing yet another Cooper-Church amendment, this time providing for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina and the termination of U.S. military operations there. The Senate's vote to strike this amendment from the bill, in my opinion, so weakened support for the aid bill that it was defeated the following day. Senator Cooper's progression of thinking on the war in Indochina finally led him to propose this year an amendment providing for the unconditional withdrawal, within 4 months of enactment, of all American forces from Indochina. This amendment was modified to make it conditional on the release of American prisoners of war and then, once again, the entire foreign aid bill was defeated. While his name will be missing from our future efforts to end the war, his spirit will be spurring us on.

To illustrate another area of his concerns and another facet of his personality I refer to his patient, meticulous labor on the foreign service grievance procedure bill, which showed his interest in people and in due process of law. Senator Cooper's judicious nature and experience acquired early in his career was typified in this endeavor. This chapter, too, is not yet closed and we will have to carry on for him.

Finally, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am grateful for having had the pleasure of working with Senator Cooper. His unfailing kindness and courtesy made our burdens easier. And the fact that you could always count on his presence when needed was a real boon to any chairman. His absence here will be felt.

I express one hope—it is that whatever administration we have after January 1973—Republican or Democratic—the President will seek to enlist the abilities of statesman Cooper to help this Nation as it faces the future.

ADDITIONAL DEATHS OF ALABAMIANS IN VIETNAM

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have placed in the Record the names of 1,163 Alabama servicemen who were listed as casualties of the Vietnam war through June 30, 1972. In the period from July 1 through September 30, 1972, the Department of Defense has notified four more Alabama families of the death of loved ones in the conflict in Vietnam, bringing the total number of casualties to 1,167.

I wish to place the names of these heroic Alabamians in the permanent archives of the Nation, paying tribute to them, on behalf of the people of Alabama, for their heroism and patriotism. May the time not be distant when there will be no occasion for more of these tragic lists.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the names of the next of kin of these four Alabamians.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LIST OF CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM, JULY 1, 1972, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1972

ARMY

CWII William C. Jesse, husband of Mrs. Linda L. Jesse, Hidden Valley, Trailer Court, Lot 5, P.O. Box 577, Daleville, 36322.

Sgt. James H. Layton, son of Mr. and Mrs. Robert O. Layton, 202 Spelgner Street, Enterprise, 36030.

WO1 Gerald D. Spradlin, son of SGM (USA) and Mrs. Herbert H. Spradlin, 42 Epps Drive, Fort Rucker, 36360.

First Lt. John A. Todd, son of Col. (USA) and Mrs. John A. Todd, 13 Gregg Way, Fort Rucker, 36360.

A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT FOR THE MINING INDUSTRY

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, Mr. John B. M. Place, president and chief executive officer of the Anaconda Co., after just 18 months in his present position, is emerging as one of the key spokesmen for the mining industry. Recently,

Shriver Vows A State Dept. 'For Peace'

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Democratic vice presidential candidate Sargent Shriver said yesterday that a McGovern administration would "convert the State Department from a passive handmaiden of the military pursuit of power to a true ministry of peace."

Charging that Richard Nixon had "failed the cause of peace" Shriver said: "We must get away from our obsession with power which excludes attention to peoples' lives. And we must reform a foreign policy bureaucracy which is a mechanism for war instead of a ministry for peace."

In a wide-ranging foreign policy speech in Philadelphia, Shriver cited U.S. failures in Vietnam, where he said that over the last four years "no legitimate basis has existed for perpetuating that war," and the subcontinent of Asia, where ignoring diplomatic reports of "selective genocide" the U.S. continued sending arms to "Pakistan's dictatorship." He also charged that "for millions in Africa, Latin America and Asia, we have become blind pursuers of power and patrons of oppression."

Shriver said: "Over the past 85 years, military thinking has come to dominate our foreign policy machinery." As a result "the State Department became a tail to the military beast, wagging at its master's command." The Secretary of State, he said, "acquiesces silently in military solutions and . . . emerges only to demean his office by engaging in political attacks."

(In New York, a spokesman for Secretary of State William P. Rogers, said: "Secretary Rogers believes that the record of American foreign policy in the last three years has been so successful as to speak for itself and not require a de-

fense. He believes that the overwhelming majority of Americans support it."

(The spokesman said Shriver's comments on Rogers himself were "not worthy of comment." Rogers is in New York to confer with foreign ministers attending the United Nations.)

Shriver said that although Mr. Nixon promised four years ago to "clean house" at the State Department, "that house is falling down." McGovern, he said, "will clean house" and institute major changes. There would be a strong Secretary of State "enjoying the President's confidence, and willing to take charge of all our civilian foreign activities."

He said policy positions would be staffed with "imaginative men and women," retirement age with pension would be lowered to 50 to "induce retirements by superfluous senior officers," recruits with training in cultural anthropology and "theologies and philosophies of other nations" would be welcome. He said the department would be "streamlined" — meaning a cutback in personnel.

The State Department said Shriver, a former ambassador to France, would take charge of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. "Today," he said, "there are more CIA and Defense Department personnel in our embassies than there are Foreign Service Officers."

Taking a swipe at the power concentrated in the hands of the president's chief foreign policy adviser Henry A. Kissinger, Shriver said: "A president needs a strong State Department — to curb the impulses of our national security bureaucracy toward military intervention; to stop uninformed meddling abroad; to coordinate our efforts toward peace so that the nations of the world know that peace is our end, not power for the sake of power."

He also supported efforts to revive Congress' "constitutional role on issues of war and peace and new foreign commitments."

Shriver, who spoke to a mostly student audience in Conwell Baptist Church on the Temple University Campus, lamented that "our leaders no longer dream of giving our nation her truth." He said: "This is not surprising. A bureaucracy which is built for war will make truth its first casualty. Policies which emphasize power maneuverings invite the treatment of the American public as one more pawn on the international chessboard. Public opinion is treated as an object for manipulation rather than a voice to be heeded."

20 AUG 1972



By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

CIA helps to curb, not aid, dope trade

It is still not common knowledge that in 1971 President Nixon ordered the CIA to join the fight against the international narcotics trade, or that, according to John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation."

It seems, at first glance, a strange choice. The CIA has no executive powers at home or abroad, and no expertise in narcotics or in criminal police work. Why, then, was it deployed on this particular firing line, and what contribution has it made?

The answers can be found in the complex nature of the drug trade.

Most of the world's raw opium originates in Turkey or in the "Golden Triangle" of the Burma-Thailand-Laos border. Tightly organized and constantly changing channels bring it to such diverse areas as Vientiane, Bangkok, Hong Kong or Marseille for processing, and equally complex routes via still other countries bring it to the borders of America.

The current attack on the trade is two-pronged: By diplomatic pressures to reduce raw opium and finished heroin production, and, since production can never be eliminated entirely, to increase

the effectiveness of the U.S. Customs Bureau by timely forewarning of specific smuggling shipments.

None of the countries touched by the trade can do this alone. The Turkish government can move against raw opium production; French, British and Thai police can crack down on processing and smuggling, with varying degrees of success.

Some powerless

Some countries can do little or nothing; the opium areas in Burma and Thailand are controlled by autonomous insurgent groups depending on the opium for economic survival, while no government in Laos — there are several — has any real control over the landscape. Other countries, used for transshipment, may not be aware of what is going on.

But, sophisticated or not, what these countries cannot do is coordinate their activities; because with the best will in the world the liaison mechanisms on the proper levels do not exist.

The French police, for example, can be as effective as any in the world. But if they are operating against a processing installation in Marseille with an input from Izmir, they simply cannot get in touch with the local Turkish police to coordinate their plans. They have neither the funds, manpower, nor charter to do so. They can only report within their own government, until at the proper level their information is passed to the Turks through diplomatic channels, after which it must filter down on the other side.

The CIA is made to order to broker such exchanges. CIA stations and bases throughout the world have direct liaison contact with local security forces, and they maintain a superb communications network. The agency can serve as a link between countries and organizations which have never been in touch with each other before, and which would have formidable problems if they tried, passing timely and accurate intelligence to the exact level where it is required.

The CIA also can collect operational intelligence on the sprawling ramifications of the trade, especially in countries which cannot do this for themselves.

From raw production through processing to the final smuggling attempt, a narcotics chain may involve scores of people in a dozen countries, and because security is at a premium, its organization parallels that of a clandestine intelligence network.

The techniques employed to penetrate both are identical, and the CIA's stock-in-trade is its skill in spotting, developing, recruiting and managing agent assets for the collection of intelligence.

The French and the British, of course, can do this work themselves, and CIA entry into their domestic criminal work is out of the question. Other, less developed countries, however, cannot manage such activities themselves without the training that CIA liaison can provide.

The CIA also has the requisite headquarters establishment to support and coordinate such a world-wide

*The CIA does
serve to fund
Air America,
but it cannot
practicably
detect all the
narcotics taken
aboard, some
by immune
high officials*

program, setting up and maintaining the multi-national files involved, running traces and analyzing and collecting the raw information so that finished intelligence can be passed to appropriate authorities for action.

Coordination

The CIA, in fact, probably is the only organization in the world that can do such a job, and it has recently established a special headquarters branch to coordinate the work. The field stations were long ago ordered into the battle.

One of the first fruits of CIA labor has been a lengthy report to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which promises to become the guide book on which the fight will rest.

In considerable detail, it covers the entire world opium situation country by country, tracing out licit and illicit opium production, processing, and distribution, as well as summarizing the problems faced by the individual countries and the multilateral control efforts. The report is unclassified.

20 AUG 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Miamian's Novel Is Blood, Guts In Pulp Manner

COMPANY MAN, by Joe
Maggio; G.P. Putnam; \$5.95.

Reviewed by LAWRENCE MAHONEY

About the most accurate appraisal of this first novel is to call it an expanded version of the men's blood and guts fiction that appears in stag-

pulp magazines. That essentially is what Miamian Joe Maggio has done.

The publisher touts it as a powerful novel of modern warfare, a rival to Robin Moore's "The Green Berets" of a few years back. Heady adventure stuff, but it doesn't measure up.

MUCH of the book is set in Miami, Coconut Grove to be exact. Maggio has long played the soldier-of-fortune there and the book's Nick Martin doubtlessly is based on himself.

The paragraphs of this book are stuffed to overflowing with military abbreviations. This doesn't help Maggio's chopped style either and he has a lot to learn about dialogue.

It is quite easy to write such fiction about the Central Intelligence Agency because the truth about that superspy "company" is so hard to come by.

MAGGIO'S story line centers on Nick Martin, a Hemingway-type hero, a maverick who finds himself in the contract employment of the CIA in Miami and Guatemala during the buildup for the Bay of Pigs episode.

Specifically, he is employed by something called SOD (Special Operating Division), a paramilitary group used to do the CIA's dirtiest work. After the abortive Cuba invasion, Martin finds himself in a variety of other difficult spots.

It is in the cockpit of Indochina that Martin finds himself disillusioned with the "Company" because of a series of gory missions, including one which devastated the fishing villages of North Vietnam and triggered the Tonkin Gulf incident and ultimately the Tonkin Resolution which plunged the U.S. headlong into the Vietnamese Civil War.

IT IS IN Laos near the North Viet border that Martin crosses up his superiors and finds himself arrested for crossing the border to rescue tribesmen he had trained and sent over.

The book ends with a totally disillusioned hero leaving "the Company" for a local mercenary force in the Congo, where he becomes a true mercenary, risking his life in combat only for money, with no concern for cause.

If Maggio's book is based on fact, which the publisher claims it is, then the CIA training and operations are even more weird and unchecked than Americans have had reason to believe before.

Lawrence Mahoney is a Herald staff writer.

14 August 1972

STATINTL

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The Urban Guerrillas

Speculation on "international conspiracies"—conspiracies of any political coloration—fell into disfavor in the 1950s, but the pendulum now may have swung back, and rightly so. Recent events, and intelligence estimates leaked by the CIA, indicate that at least one red-hot international conspiracy is flourishing wildly—that of the urban guerrilla.

The world abounds with leftist, Marxist, and Communist-oriented urban guerrilla groups, from the Tupamaros of Uruguay to the Red Army of Japan, from the Palestinian Liberation Front in the Mid-East to the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army. These groups consistently make nauseating headlines with their hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorist bombings. By any reasonable moral code, their members are without souls, unhesitatingly willing to gun down a man just to see him bleed.

No better example of the breed could be provided than the three members of the Japanese Red Army who recently wiped out 26 innocent

bystanders at Tel Aviv's Lod Airport. That act represents the most concrete example to date of the kind of co-operation being established among urban guerrilla groups: At his trial, the sole surviving Japanese gunman confessed that the Lod massacre had been requested by the Palestinian Liberation Front, which preferred not to do its own dirty work.

It is one thing to kill and to kidnap for your own cause, activities which our own OSS engaged in with a high degree of skill; it is quite another to blast and butcher without reservation—for a cause that seeks not peace, but destruction. For in the end, all the urban guerrilla groups have only one goal: to preside over the ash heap that they create. Small wonder, then, that the CIA and other Western intelligence organizations are discovering—and leaking—more information about an international urban guerrilla network.

Americans must hope that the network has not yet spread to include the bomb-and-burn types here. But if it has, our home-grown murderers will need time to crank up their bloody campaign, and by then the experience of other governments may provide a satisfactory method of handling urban guerrillas. In fact, that is why the current conflict in Northern Ireland is so significant for the Free World. Nowhere else has the urban terrorist come so close to destroying a nation; nowhere else has a government tried so hard to destroy the destroyers. Even if no formal international conspiracy exists, the odds are that the outcome of the battle for Northern Ireland will determine the outcome of the next battle for Berkeley.

Neo-Isolationist

By Godfrey Sperling,

The Christian Science Monitor

"From an interview with Senator McGovern and from conversations with some of his top consultants on foreign policy it becomes abundantly clear that the Senator is bent on leading this country into a kind of neo-isolationism, where our global role will be as minimal as possible much less, for example, than that envisioned by President Nixon as the result of his Guam doctrine of disengagement."

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MILWAUKEE, WISC.
JOURNAL

E - 359,036

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AUG 1 3 1972

From OSS to CIA: An Exciting Record Raises Questions

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. University of California Press. \$10.95.

By Bill Hibbard
of The Journal Staff

THOUGH this book is a history of the Office of Strategic Services, its most provocative lines deal with the Central Intelligence Agency, lineal descendant of OSS.

In his painstakingly documented work, R. Harris Smith concludes that CIA, despite its penchant for supporting entrenched dictatorial governments, has not yet become "the reactionary monster the New Left has created as its straw man." But he warns:

"Unless the agency leadership makes a determined effort to renew the OSS passion for democratic dissent in yet another generation of American intelligence officers, the reality of CIA may soon coincide with its sinister image in the intellectual community."

Through the reign of Allen Dulles, Smith writes, CIA possessed a strong intellectual ferment of liberals and conservatives interacting, a basic tenet in the philosophy of William (Wild Bill) Donovan, founder of OSS. Smith quotes Robert F. Kennedy as observing that during the McCarthy era, CIA became a liberal refuge and collected some of the best minds in the country in the process.

And though it has been responsible for some monumental mistakes, such as the Bay of Pigs disaster, and questionable actions, it has at times also produced more accurate information than the nation's other intelligence

agencies, Smith relates. He notes that during the Johnson administration's Vietnam buildup, while other agencies were reporting how well the war in Vietnam was going, CIA reports were pessimistic and actually antiwar.

In his preface, Smith makes a plea that certainly bears heeding:

"For too many years, social scientists have paid scant attention to the broad problem of official secrecy. The majority of American academicians may spend hours denouncing the sinister CIA, yet not a single university in the United States fosters a serious research effort into the organization and activities of the 'intelligence community,' that massive bureaucratic conglomerate that has played such a major role in our foreign policy.

"That vacuum ought to be filled. The academicians should form a partnership with journalists in providing the American citizenry with a reasoned and thoughtful critique of the excesses of clandestine bureaucracy. I offer this book as a first step toward extending intellectual responsibility into a new field of public concern."

Heavily detailed, Smith's account of OSS organization and operations may tell the plain reader more than he wants to know about this amateur espionage, clandestine politico-military machine that, despite shortcomings, emerged with the respect of its foreign competition. But it's fascinating reading for anyone who wants to delve into these World War II secrets, the seeds of victory in Europe and in the Orient.

Drawing upon the nation's intellectual storehouse, Donovan patched together one of the highest powered brain trusts ever assembled. The organization was peppered with men destined for high political, professional and academic posts, among them



R. Harris Smith

Arthur Schlesinger, Stewart Alsop, John Gardner, Arthur Goldberg, Walt Rostow, David Bruce, C. Douglas Dillon, Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, the current CIA chief. Contributors to OSS during World War II — though not members — were two Asians named Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung, both of whom were at least partly on our side at that time.

Smith's book, three years in the making, helps us understand how complex the situation was in both China and Indochina as World War II ended and why the muddle has continued.

Despite its massive detail, this is a readable work, and it is likely to become the standard reference work on OSS. The author is a political science lecturer and was briefly a CIA research analyst.

STATINTL

18 AUG 1972

'The Nation's' Editor: A Trend-Setter With a Peculiar Optimism

A Commentary

By Nicholas von Hoffman

NEW YORK—Carey McWilliams isn't a Manhattan magazine editor type. He isn't hip, he isn't trendy, or eccentric or legendary or outrageous or a hard-to-see personage who lives among the richies. If he were like that, *The Nation* magazine, which he has edited for 21 years, would not be the small, seldom-seen but immensely important publication it is.

Under McWilliams, *The Nation* first published such diverse writers as James Baldwin and Ralph Nader, and if it wasn't the very first to print Hunter Thompson, it was McWilliams who suggested to Thompson that he write about the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang. The resulting *Nation* article was the basis of a book, and a writing career that has come to special fruition in Thompson's recent work for *Rolling Stone* magazine.

These are only a few of the many names that have germinated from beginnings in *The Nation*. Something like 10 books a year grow from articles in this thin little magazine that costs \$12.50 a year and has a circulation that doesn't exceed 27,000.

But it isn't only careers which the magazine nurtures: It's also ideas and issues. Regular subscribers were being touted onto the truth about Vietnam in 1954. In 1960, *Nation* readers were learning about the true dimensions of the "military industrial complex" in a special issue entitled, "Juggernaut: The Warfare State." A year later another special issue informed them about the true nature and mission of the CIA. Years before anybody else was even asking questions, while the rest of us were sitting back and cheering, the writers McWilliams brought to the pages of his magazine were

asking hard questions about every topic from the FBI to urban renewal. Most recently it was another special issue on cable TV that has gotten some of the rest of the media to look at what may be the biggest public swindle since municipalities were giving away trolley franchises.

In the category of *Nation* accomplishments you can see the difference between a Carey McWilliams and many other editors. Other editors try to find out what the trend of the moment is and then get with it; McWilliams doesn't cash in on trends, he makes them.

The Nation, for instance, was the first publication to print the experiences of a former FBI agent—someone who was really in a position to know what was going on inside that organization. This kind of piece has become almost routine today, but McWilliams says,

"When we did that one on the FBI you could almost hear the rest of the press listening. Then you could see the delayed reaction here and there with the press saying, 'there may be some merit to the argument.' We broke the ice."

It takes more than a pick ax and courage to be an ice breaker. You have to have the eyes to see the ice and the smarts to get yourself to a frozen body of water. You must have the gift of being able to look at what everybody else is looking at and see what they can't.

Maybe McWilliams received that gift because he was born 66 years ago in Steamboat, Colo., the son of a cattle rancher who went broke in the minidepression of 1920. Not only did he have the family experience to tell him that all stories don't necessarily end well, but he also grew up in a time when native American

radicalism was still a force, particularly in the western states where people were fighting the railroads, the mining companies and the eastern banking interests. "This native radical tradition is the only tradition I've ever been able to identify myself with," he says, "it's discontinuous, it disappears, it breaks off, but it always comes back."

It surfaced again in McWilliams' person when the family moved to Los Angeles, and the young Carey, now a lawyer, was trying to do something to help migratory farm workers. His first book, "Factories in the Fields," was on that subject and got him appointed in 1938 to head the state farm labor agency. He must have done a pretty good job because he says that "when Earl Warren was elected governor in 1942 he announced that his first official act was my removal." He also fought with the future chief justice over the removal of the state's Japanese-American population into concentration camps.

Later he was to fight Joe McCarthy, but perhaps his toughest fight is keeping the weekly magazine going. He's too poor to pay writers in anything much more tangible than prestige. It has no advertising and no money to get new subscriptions in the mail to 333 Sixth Ave., although there are probably thousands of people who would find in *The Nation* both news and ideas they won't get in other publications until years later.

None of this either tires or depresses Carey McWilliams. Even getting mugged and beaten the other day in the elevator of his dusty office building didn't take the fight out of him. The peculiar optimism of the native American radical sustains him and enables him to do better what others with more money and more glory do far less well.

WASHINGTON STAR
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2 AUG 1972

BOOKS

STATINTL James Bonds of Yesteryear

By ROGER JELLINEK
New York Times News Service

In 1941 a British naval intelligence officer named Ian Fleming recommended to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, devotion to duty, languages, and wide experience." Donovan, a World War I hero and successful Wall Street lawyer, understood the fantasies of writers and presidents, and in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an international secret service staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly reckless," with "disciplined daring" and trained for "aggressive action."

The Office of Strategic Services came to include such James Bonds as John Birch, Norman O. Brown, David K. E. Bruce, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, William Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Galbraith, John W. Gardner and Arthur J. Goldberg. There were others — Sterling Hayden, August Heckscher, Roger O. Hilsman, Philip Horton, H. Stuart Hughes, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Ringling North. And still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Rostow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Ralph de Toledano — to name just a few of the hundreds in this book by R. Harris Smith.

SMITH, WHO WAS in the trade himself, resigning in 1968 after a "very brief, uneventful, and undistinguished association with the most misunderstood bureaucracy of the American government," the Central Intelligence Agency, now lectures in political science at the University of California's Extension Division. "This history of America's first central intelligence agency" is "secret" because Smith was denied access to OSS archives, and so had to rely on the existing literature supplemented by some 200 written and verbal recollections of OSS alumni.

The book is densely packed with the bewildering variety of OSS exploits in World War II: Spying, sabotage, propaganda, military training missions, politicking and coordinating resistance groups against the Germans.

OSS agents had to compete as much with their allies as with their enemies.

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. Univ. of California Press. 458 pages. Illustrated. \$10.95.

In France and Switzerland, where Allen Dulles operated, the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) was especially grudging. In Germany itself, the OSS lost out to more orthodox American military intelligence, though paradoxically they were strongly represented at Nuremberg, where Gen. Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor — at the same time that the head of the Nazi secret service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, was under OSS protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the OSS in China and Indochina. There were

both pro-Communists and anti-Communists in the OSS, and most agents sympathized with Asian nationalists, so that the OSS aided Thai partisans against the British and, of course, more famously, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an OSS medic saved Ho Chi Minh's life). Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy of Indochina after the Japanese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a fascinating setpiece.

The book ends with an account of the transformation of the OSS into its "mirror image," the CIA. Smith's admiration for the OSS's wartime pragmatism, its "tradition of dissent" and its anticolonialism suggests his thesis: That the OSS/CIA has been made the straw man of the radical and liberal left. In fact, he asserts, the CIA has been the principal guardian of liberal values in the "intelligence community."

HE REMINDS US that the CIA fought Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and he argues that the CIA's campaign to fund anti-Communist liberals successfully undermined international Communist organizations and disarmed the paranoid anti-Communism of the FBI and others at home. He notes that CIA liberals worked against Batista for Castro, who betrayed them, allowing the CIA conservatives to plan the Bay of Pigs action. Finally, he points to the evidence in the Pentagon Papers that the CIA has been a critic of the Vietnam War from the beginning.

But the question remains whether the OSS "tradition of dissent" is meaningful, whether it doesn't compromise liberals as much as aid them. Smith's book is full of cryptic references to former OSS agents now prominent in international business and finance. CIA liberalism has not prevented a number of CIA-fomented coups d'état in favor of military regimes. Even CIA liberal criticism of the war in Vietnam seems to have had little effect on policy. All might be fair in time of war, but Smith ought to have scouted the need for a permanent bureaucracy part of whose function is officially devoted to clandestine political manipulations abroad in time of "peace."



PREDECESSOR AGENCY TO CIA

OSS Advocated Aid to Ho in 1945, New Book Reveals

STATINTL

BERKELEY (UPI)—Although the Central Intelligence Agency has become the bugaboo of American leftists, its World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, was a lonely voice for support of leftist anticolonial organizations, according to a new history of the OSS.

The World War II spy outfit, says author R. Harris Smith, was a collection of distinguished intellectuals and madcap pranksters who sometimes saw things in a clearer light than their bosses in Washington.

The first American casualty of the Vietnam war, Smith says, was OSS operative Col. Peter Dewey, killed by machine-gun fire on Sept. 25, 1945, near Saigon. Dewey was shot while passing through a Viet Minh roadblock. His job: Liaison man with the Viet Minh. He was killed, Smith claims, because the Vietnamese sentry mistakenly thought he was French.

The OSS was an advocate of extending aid to the Viet Minh in their

fight first against Japanese occupiers and later against the French who tried to reclaim their Indochinese empire.

In his book "OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency," published today by the University of California Press, the 25-year-old Berkeley graduate student observes: "Long before the Japanese surrender, OSS planners had suggested that 'American cooperation with patriotic, subversive revolutionary groups of Southeastern Asia would appreciably increase our offensive power against Japan.'"

Thus began the brief American association with Nguyen Ai Quoc, sprung from the clutches of Chiang Kai-shek's secret police chief by the Americans.

Quoc later took the name Ho Chi Minh.

Ho and his professor-general Vo Nguyen Giap slowly built their organization, cooperating with the OSS, and sabotaged the Japanese and

Viet¹⁵ French. Ho's Viet Minh seems to have been the only organization for which Americans in Asia had any respect.

Smith's book is based on more than 200 interviews with former OSS operatives from all theaters of war and on nearly all available documents, some of them secret. It covers all OSS activities in all the theaters of World War II and unveils fascinating details of heretofore secret operations.

Smith also tells for the first time the part that Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini played as a key Vatican agent in a complex American espionage network that collected secret intelligence in Tokyo. Montini now is Pope Paul VI.

The OSS was a mixed bag, Smith records, headed by a millionaire, the World War I hero and Wall Street lawyer William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan. It numbered many millionaires on its roster, as well as White Russians, New Dealers, conservatives and radicals.

But Smith thinks it had something the CIA could use today.

"The CIA has not yet become the reactionary monster the new left has created as its straw man," he writes. "But unless the agency leadership makes a determined effort to renew the OSS passion for democratic dissent in yet another generation of American intelligence officers, the reality of CIA may soon coincide with its sinister image in the intellectual community."

26 JUL 1972

Books of The Times

Wonderful Wizards of O.S.S.

By ROGER JELLINEK

OSS. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. Illustrated. 458 Pages. University of California Press. \$10.95.

In 1941 a British Naval Intelligence officer named Ian Fleming recommended to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, devotion to duty, languages, and wide experience." Donovan, a World War I hero and successful Wall Street lawyer, understood the fantasies of writers and Presidents, and in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an international secret service staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly reckless" with "disciplined daring" and trained for "aggressive action."

The Office of Strategic Services came to include such James Bonds as John Birch, Norman O. Brown, David K. E. Bruce, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, William Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Galbraith, John W. Gardner, Arthur J. Goldberg and Murray Gurfein. There were others—Sterling Hayden, August Heekseher, Roger O. Hilsman, Philip Horton, H. Stuart Hughes, Carl Kaysen, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Ringling North, Serge Obolensky. And still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Rostow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Paul Sweezy, Ralph de Toledano—to name just a few of the hundreds in this book by R. Harris Smith.

Mr. Smith, who was in the trade himself, resigning in 1968 after a "very brief, uneventful, and undistinguished association with the most misunderstood bureaucracy of the American Government," the Central Intelligence Agency, now lectures in political science at the University of California's Extension Division. "This history of America's first central intelligence agency" is "secret" because Mr. Smith was denied access to O.S.S. archives, and so had to rely on the existing literature supplemented by some 200 written and verbal recollections of O.S.S. alumni.

Both Ends Against the Middle

The book is densely packed with the bewildering variety of O.S.S. exploits in World War II: spying, sabotage, propaganda, military training missions, politicking and coordinating resistance groups against the Germans. "Casablanca" caught the spirit of the Byzantine plotting in French North Africa, with the O.S.S. trying to undermine the Vichy and German authorities, while various resistance groups in Italy, Yugoslavia, China and Greece, tried to use the O.S.S. for their own ends. O.S.S. agents played both ends against the middle in the virtual civil wars between conservatives and left-wing partisans. In one holy alliance worthy of Graham Greene, the O.S.S. gratefully accepted the

later registered agent for the Haitian exile lobby in Washington). They had volunteered to collect and pass on firsthand intelligence on strategic bombing targets in

Japan. Cardinal Montini is now Pope Paul VI.

O.S.S. agents had to compete as much with their allies as with their enemies. In France and Switzerland, where Allen Dulles operated, the British S.O.E. (Special Operations Executive) was especially grudging. In Germany itself, the O.S.S. lost out to more orthodox American military intelligence, though paradoxically they were strongly represented at Nuremberg, where General Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor—at the same time that the head of the Nazi Secret Service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, was under O.S.S. protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and Russia.

Role in the Far East

From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the O.S.S. in China and Indochina. There were both pro-Communists and anti-Communists in the O.S.S., and most agents sympathized with Asian nationalists, so that the O.S.S. aided Thai partisans against the British and of course more famously, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an O.S.S. medic saved Ho Chi Minh's life). Mr. Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy of Indochina after the Japanese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a fascinating setpiece.

The book ends with an account of the transformation of the O.S.S. into its "mirror image," the C.I.A. Mr. Smith's admiration for the O.S.S.'s wartime pragmatism, its "tradition of dissent" and its anticolonialism suggests his thesis: that the O.S.S./C.I.A. has been made the straw man of the radical and liberal left. In fact, he asserts, the C.I.A. has been the principal guardian of liberal values in the "intelligence community." He reminds us that the C.I.A. fought Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, and he argues that the C.I.A.'s campaign to fund anti-Communist liberals successfully undermined international Communist organizations and disarmed the paranoid anti-Communism of the F.B.I. and others at home. He notes that C.I.A. liberals worked against Batista for Castro, who betrayed them, allowing the C.I.A. conservatives to plan the Bay of Pigs. Finally, he points to the evidence in the Pentagon Papers that the C.I.A. has been a critic of the Vietnam war from the beginning.

But the question remains whether the O.S.S. "tradition of dissent" is meaningful, whether it doesn't compromise liberals as much as aid them. Mr. Smith's book is full of the kind of anecdotal evidence that O.S.S. agents now prominent in international business and finance. C.I.A. liberalism has not prevented a number of C.I.A.-fomented

Even C.I.A. liberal criticism of the war in Vietnam seems to have had little effect on policy. All might be fair in time of war, but Mr. Smith ought to have scouted the need for a permanent bureaucracy part of whose function is officially devoted to clandestine political manipulations abroad in time of "peace."

STATINTL

COLUMBUS, GA.

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JUL 18 1972

National Security Act's provisions

Diminishing law's credibility

There is too much coincidental similarity to certain publishing exploits for a pattern to emerge, a pattern which seemingly argues that a deliberate and step-by-step assault is being made on the National Security Act. That law 25 years ago created great changes in the role of the military forces and gave this country something it had never had before—an effective intelligence establishment.

The National Security Act, passed July 26, 1947, created a National Military Establishment which later became the Defense Department. Three bodies were then set up which have grown in importance over the years:

—The Joint Chiefs of Staff was created as an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up by us and Great Britain in World War II. These men are responsible for preparing military plans, reviewing over-all military requirements and directing unified and specified combat commands.

—The National Security Council was created to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security . . . to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power."

—The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" but specifically limited so as to "have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement or internal security functions."

Robert MacNamara, Secretary of Defense for both President Kennedy and Johnson from 1961-1968, merged Defense Department intelligence agencies and otherwise used the terms of the National Security Act to streamline and concentrate the power more effectively in the hands of civilian directorate.

The present critics of our defense, intelligence and foreign policies—to name only a few of the chosen targets—have turned away from their own past creations with great zeal on all fronts. As the latter-day concentration of power in the Department of Defense and the other two agencies named was the essential creation of the New Frontier, where the great mass of critics involved have their origins either firsthand or as latterday heirs, it is characteristic that they would turn on this ugly reminder of their own past.

C. Marton Tyrrell, in a book published in 1970, gave a good, typical statement of the reason that the National Security Act of 1947, tailored into modern application by the New Frontiersmen when they held the White House in the 1960's, is now anathema, when he wrote this:

"(Pentagon officials and military planners, etc.) have tended to diminish the role of the State department and place the Department of Defense in the quasi-official position of suggesting foreign policy actions."

His book also charged that the CIA and the National Security Council have "chipped away" at the State Department's policy-making powers.

The power so carefully concentrated in the hands of the leading figures of the New Frontier went into other hands when a Republican administration entered the White House. There is hardly any certainty that it will be

day frontiersman this fall. They wish to at least destroy the instrument if they cannot seize the levers again. Destruction in the legislature of the National Security Act, which enabled us to become a true world power, is the real critical goal they must have as a minimum if the White House is again denied them.

The public record shows clearly enough that the Senate committee with the most vested interest in the State Department's pre-eminence, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in this campaign against the National Security Act's provisions. (That is the basic point of the entire exercise, we believe, to attack that law.)

Political rhetoric ranging from dialogue to diatribe has been lavished on the targets provided by the terms of that act. A political campaign is essentially based on a great drive to throw that law out and do away with its accomplishments. All of this is the obvious.

What is not so obvious is the pattern involving actual violations of security provisions and their calculated effect to demean and diminish the law's credibility and to make it an easy target when the appropriate time in the House and Senate comes.

There have been those Pentagon Papers, publication of secret minutes of the National Security Council, and publication of many things of that ilk. Now a purportedly full and detailed disclosure of the method and results of the most sensitive operation imaginable, the interception and decoding of Russian secret communications, can be read in a magazine with a long past record of such "scoops."

The material involved is carefully judged, we think, to provide maximum embarrassment, to provide material for ridicule, and to give the least possible chance of violators of technical security regulations being punished or recognized as traitors by the American public. It's sensitivity and its real importance has escalated, however, with each escapade's success.

Whether this is a contrived and coordinated pattern or whether the terms of the opposition to the creations of the National Security Act dictate the manner in which the attacks are made, we believe that the ultimate target is now very clear indeed.

This country will be put in jeopardy of a grave kind indeed when the final assault on that law is made. We warn of it now.

HARRISONBURG, VA.
 NEWS-RECORD
 JUL 17 1972
 M - 20,452

National Security Act

STATINTL

Side Effect Unintended

By RICHARD L. WORSNOP

The national security act, which became law 25 years ago, has been described as "perhaps the most far-reaching measure in its effect upon the role of the military in American life since the formation of the Navy Department in 1798."

By bringing the three branches of the armed services together in a single department, the act aimed to eliminate inter-service duplication and rivalry. But it also had the unintended side-effect of profoundly altering the process of formulating U.S.-foreign policy.

In addition to creating a National Military Establishment, later to become the Defense Department, the National Security Act set up three bodies that have grown in importance over the years. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff was an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up by the United States and Great Britain early in world War II. It was given the responsibility of preparing military plans, reviewing over-all military requirements, and directing unified and specified combat commands.

Over and above the National Military Establishment, the act provided for a National Security Council "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security," with the specific duty to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power."

CIA Established

Finally, the act established a Central Intelligence Agency. CIA was to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," but was to "have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement... or internal security functions."

It remained for Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, to utilize to the full the powers inherent in the National Security Act. While McNamara found the basic structure of the Defense Department to be "entirely sound," he nevertheless instituted a number of changes.

In 1961 the Tactical Air Command and Strategic Army Corps were placed under the direction

of the U.S. Strike Command. The communications and intelligence branches of the three military services were merged. McNamara's most significant achievement, however, may have been the streamlining of arms and equipment procurement procedures.

"Despite its awesome power and the worldwide sweep of its activities, the basic mission of the Department of Defense is simply stated," McNamara wrote in 1968. "The mission is military security; or, more broadly, to maintain in constant readiness the military forces necessary to protect the nation from attack, keep its commitments abroad and support its foreign policy."

Suggests Foreign Policy

Some critics argue that the Defense Department has a hand in shaping foreign policy, too. Discussion of contingency plans by Pentagon officials and military planners of foreign countries, C. Merton Tyrrell wrote in 1970, "have tended to diminish the role of the State Department and place the Department of Defense in the quasi-official position of 'suggesting' foreign policy actions."

The CIA and the National Security Council likewise have clipped away at State's policy-making powers. For better or worse, the National Security Act has had consequences that Congress could scarcely have foreseen a quarter-century ago.

SHREVEPORT, LA.

TIMES

JUL 17 1972

M - 91,183

S - 115,298

Making a Strong America

Twenty-five years ago — on July 26, 1947 — Congress passed the National Security Act, which has had a profound influence on the form of the nation's military services.

The act consolidated the three branches of the armed forces into a National Military Establishment, which later became the Defense Department. It set up the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare military plans, review over-all military requirements and direct combat commands.

In addition, the National Security Act established the National Security Council to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and

military policies relating to the national security." The act also formed the Central Intelligence Agency, directing it to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," while denying it police, subpoena or internal security powers.

These steps, and subsequent orders by various presidents and secretaries of defense, have aided considerably in military readiness in this age of the nuclear weapon.

Because of the act and later modifications, the nation's defense structure has had a greater input than ever into the making of foreign policy, assuring a strong defense posture for the United States.

STATINTL

Saturday Review Press

Fall Books

August 1972 January 1973

Patrick J. McGarvey

CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS

This important new book by a veteran intelligence agent shatters the myth that the CIA is a super-efficient organization, capable of conceiving and pulling off every imaginable kind of trick and strategy. Plagued by the same problems that beset all large organizations, the CIA is actually a bureaucratic morass deluged in paper and sorely out of touch with both policy-making and reality.

In *CIA: The Myth and the Madness*, Patrick J. McGarvey shows how the various intelligence agencies duplicate each other's efforts, often competing with each other and refusing to share information (the *Pueblo* affair was a classic example). He protests the unnecessarily massive accumulation of raw intelligence data in quantities far beyond the capacity of the analysts. And he explores for the first time the human side of intelligence work, picturing the strain, the broken marriages, the trauma of exposing children to danger in foreign outposts, the overwork and tension that can lead to ulcers, even death.

McGarvey believes that intelligence operations are imperative for the safety of the country, but believes that our agencies need a complete overhauling. His carefully considered but impassioned analysis not only examines the major problems but also offers some sound recommendations about what can be done to correct them.

Patrick McGarvey was a member of the United States intelligence community for fourteen years.

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news

STATINTL

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FULL PUBLIC ACCOUNTING BY FBI CALLED FOR IN DEMOCRATIC PLANNING GROUP REPORT TO 1972 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE

Washington, May 6 -- Charging that the "FBI has gone 50 years without a full public accounting, particularly of unjustified political surveillance," the Intelligence and Security Planning Group of the Democratic Policy Council called on responsible authorities in the Executive Branch "to re-examine the impact of the Bureau's archaic assumptions and practices on individual privacy and political liberty."

Courtney Evans, former Deputy Director of the FBI and planning group member, said: "A way must be found to maintain the integrity of the FBI at the same time providing policy guidance and direction in security and intelligence investigations particularly in areas where there is likely to be a legitimate difference between freedom for individual citizens and security for the government itself."

The planning group recommended:

- The appointment of a new Director of the FBI whose primary qualities are administrative skills and policy-setting capabilities;
- The same thoroughness in selecting the Director of the FBI that is required for a Supreme Court appointee;
- The establishment of a Congressional watchdog committee including members from Judiciary, Appropriations, and Foreign affairs committees as well as other committees and subcommittees concerned with citizen privacy, crime control and government efficiency.

Prepared under the chairmanship of Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.), the report is the eighth in a series of issue papers to be released by Democratic National Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, under the recommendations of the O'Hara Commission that documents outlining issues and alternative positions to the policies of the Nixon Administration be prepared for the Platform Committee.

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY

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E - 427,270

APR 21 1972

Of shepherds, spies, Seconals, settlers

By Marilyn Goldstein

Ann Pinchot, co-author of "Weep No More, My Lady," a book about Judy Garland, arrived at Newsday's Spring Book and Author Luncheon at the Huntington Town House yesterday without her notes. Mrs. Pinchot said her German shepherd ate them and that maybe her puppy was trying to tell her something: "That writers should be read but not heard."

Mrs. Pinchot spoke anyway, about the Garland book, written with the singer's fifth husband, Mickey Deans, and about several other books she has written in collaboration with famous persons. Ladislav Farago, the Hungarian-born former Naval intelligence officer and espionage expert, who never collaborated with anyone literally nor literally, talked about his book "The Game of the Foxes." It deals with Nazi intelligence. Meyer Levin discussed his latest novel, "The Settlers," the story of turn-of-the-century Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

Mrs. Pinchot, who calls herself "the Grandma Moses of dirty literature" (because she wrote her dirty novel, "The Man Chasers," when she was well into middle age), felt that Judy Garland would "probably have been a very nice girl from Nebraska married to a gas jockey" if it had not been for her pushy mother. Miss Garland ended up famous and on "50 amphetamines and 12 Seconals a day," Mrs. Pinchot said.

The author let her audience of about 800 persons in on the quirks of some of the famous people with whom she has worked. Writing with Jackie Gleason, she said, was "a fortnight of a nightmare." The late Bishop James A. Pike "told me he believed in premarital sex." After working with Norman Vincent Peale, Mrs. Pinchot decided he "has fantastic success because he's his own best friend." She also collaborated with Irwin Stillman on "The Doctor's Quick Weight Loss Diet" and it didn't seem to work any better for her than it did for the rest of us.

Ladislav Farago said his field made it difficult to come up with the expected book-and-author circuit jokes. Espionage is not terribly funny, he said, but he related his non-official experience of finding an apartment. He said in 1956 he read a headline stating that Myra and Jack Sobel had been indicated as spies, so he headed directly for their address, "figuring they wouldn't be needing it for a while," and rented the apartment.

Much has been made about the fact that Farago accidentally stumbled upon trunks in the National Archives filled with microfilms and documents that led to "The Game of the Foxes." But, he pointed out, "that was

only the beginning of my labors. The documents found were a lot of mumbo jumbo of codes, ciphers and mysterious references that had to be decoded before any sense was made out of them. It took a lot of digging and a lot of luck to make sense out of this mumbo jumbo." The result is a long book recounting the ingenious work of Nazi agents, double agents and triple agents.

Before the luncheon, the author, who came to the United States just before World War II, said he retired from U.S. intelligence in 1954. "I was upset about the encouragement we were giving people behind the Iron Curtain, [promising] that if they rose up we would help them." He said the Hungarian uprising showed him we didn't come through.

The CIA, he feels, is not a vicious organization, but it works beyond its field. "The CIA is given responsibilities it shouldn't have, like the guerrilla wars. You can't fight political wars militaristically," he said. "The CIA is the Cold War Pentagon. As an intelligence agency it's a good agency, but it steps beyond its grounds."

Meyer Levin drew some parallels between the early Jewish settlers who immigrated to Palestine from eastern Europe in the '20s and today's American young people. "The young people who went there . . . were experiencing a generation gap, they were dropouts, they preferred working the land to professions and they even had their own women's liberation movement."

The generation gap was in the form of the young non-believers rebelling against the orthodox Jewishness of their parents. "They were dropouts from the Yeshiva," Levin said. "They had enough of strictly formal discussions of Talmudic law . . . and they were looking for a valid way of life. They were tired of the professions they were forced into . . . they wanted to work with their hands, they wanted to reestablish their contact with the soil."

"The young girls who came along wanted to have absolute equality," he said. Girls assigned kitchen duty one day stood their ground and demanded "No cooking until you teach us to plow." Most of them learned to plow, but didn't stick with it, he said. Many of the early Palestinian Jewish girl settlers refused to go through marriage ceremonies.

Levin said the characters he drew upon for "The Settlers" were rarely treated in literature. "They were the ones who went to Palestine instead of the U.S. These people came to a fresh situation and molded it to their own desires." Levin, who lives both here and in Israel, said the book was "heavily based on real characters and situations." /II

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S - 709,123

APR 20 1972

Top 1st Amendment lawyers enter

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The government's efforts to silence a former high-ranking official of the Central Intelligence Agency took on the dimensions of a major constitutional test Wednesday when two of the nation's leading First Amendment lawyers entered the case.

Norman Dorsen, law professor at New York University and general counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, disclosed that he has

agreed to defend Victor L. Marchetti, onetime executive assistant to the deputy director of the CIA.

At the same time, it was learned that Floyd Abrams, one of the New York Times' lawyers in the Pentagon papers case, has been retained by Alfred A. Knopf Inc., the New York publishing house that has a \$40,000 contract to publish a book by Marchetti on the CIA.

Dorsen was also involved in the Times' defense as a friend of the court for the ACLU.

The Justice Department got a temporary restraining order against Marchetti Tuesday from U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. of Alexandria, Va.

Hearing set April 28

Bryan has set a closed-door hearing April 28 to determine whether Marchetti will be permanently prevented from writing or talking about intelligence activities.

Dorsen is understood to be weighing a prior motion that Bryan throw out the government's suit on the ground that it violates the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First

Amendment as upheld by the Supreme Court in the Times case.

CIA director Richard M. Helms supported the government suit with an affidavit asserting that Marchetti's proposed book and an unpublished magazine article, "Twilight of the Spooks," would compromise "currently classified intelligence (and) cause grave and irreparable harm to the national defense."

The suit demands that Marchetti turn over all classified documents he took with him on leaving the CIA in 1969. He is expected to respond that the only documents in his possession — all unclassified — are a page from the CIA phone book with his former listing, a friendly letter from Helms to Marchetti's children, and a letter of commendation from his former boss, Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, retired deputy director of the CIA.

Secrecy pact violated?

The government contends that Marchetti's decision to

publish and his numerous interviews with the press violate a secrecy agreement he signed promising not to "divulge, publish or reveal . . . classified information."

His defense is expected to be that he has not and does not intend to disclose any secrets but merely give the American people a legitimate inside look at the general way in which the CIA acts in their name.

The outline of his book, which the CIA obtained from a "confidential source" and submitted to Judge Bryan for his private perusal, reportedly indicates that Marchetti intends

to challenge the "secret charter" under which the CIA conducts major clandestine operations as not in keeping with the spirit of the 1947 law which created the CIA.

The action against Marchetti represents the first time the government has moved to silence a former government official who had access to classified information.

Former U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was not challenged when he published a book that was mildly critical of the agency.

Similarly, several high-ranking officials, including at least three Presidents, have drawn on top secret information for their books without any legal action against them.

CIA case

CIA Shifts

Major General Vernon A. Walters, U.S. military attaché in Paris, has been appointed Deputy Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. press notes that under the recently adopted plan for the reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community the importance of this post has greatly increased. The Deputy Director will be in charge of virtually all the current operations of the CIA, while the Director will be mainly concerned with the coordination of the operations of all the espionage agencies, including the Defence Intelligence Agency and the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence.

Walters, who is 55, has been military attaché and performed intelligence functions in Italy, Brazil and South Vietnam. He is fluent in Russian, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch, and accompanied Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon on foreign visits as their personal interpreter.

The "New York Times" says that General Walters has been "personally identified with Mr. Nixon for more than twenty years," and that the President did not consult with CIA Director Richard Helms when making the appointment. ✓

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KENNEDY NEMESIS

Although officials at GOP Headquarters recently came out with the "information" that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass) would at the last moment storm the Democrat Convention and grab the Presidential nomination, according to political insiders no such move is in the making. They cite the following fact, which has been kept secret for nine years, to back their certitude that Teddy will remain on the sidelines during the coming Presidential election, regardless of whether the Democrat Convention in Miami will want to draft him or not.

Back in 1963, shortly after President Kennedy's assassination, Robert F. Kennedy, while he was still Attorney-General, conducted his own investigation of the death of his brother. That private investigation, which ran parallel with the official inquiry into the magnicide conducted by the Warren Commission, was featured by trips to this country by an Inspector Hamilton, former Chief Inspector of Scotland Yard. Hamilton, an old friend of Joseph P. Kennedy, with whom he had many contacts during the latter's ambassadorship in London, had been retained by Bobby to help unravel the real truth about the murder of J.F.K.

After long conferring with the members of the Kennedy family and making a few discreet soundings with his own contacts, Hamilton zeroed on the fact that the assassination of John Kennedy had occurred very shortly after his brother Bobby had made some preliminary moves of taking direct, personal control of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, whose leadership he blamed for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Hamilton, following the "*cui prodest*" ("whom does it benefit?") reasoning, reached the conclusion that Bobby's move to seize control of the C.I.A. had something to do with the murder of his elder brother.

After Bobby's own assassination in 1968, it is not known whether Teddy has the documentation Bobby had collected in his private investigation or whether it has been destroyed.

But apparently Teddy has become convinced of the correctness of Hamilton's conclusion, and furthermore, considers it to have been further vindicated by Bobby's own death—which occurred within a matter of days after he threw his hat into the presidential ring and was on the way to put himself again in the position to take over the free-spending, powerful cloak-and-dagger agency.

Teddy Kennedy receives an average of about ten death threats a week via anonymous phone calls and letters. Voice prints of the phone calls

and copies of the letters are turned over to the U.S. Secret Service. None of the culprits have been apprehended. Incidentally, it has been decided that Kennedy does not need Secret Service protection since he is a "non-candidate." All the other announced presidential candidates have a Secret Service detail assigned for their protection during the campaign. Significantly, as previously reported in WO, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger exercises direct control over the CIA, FBI, Secret Service and all other security and intelligence agencies.

12 April 1972

STATINTL

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Bring The CIA To Heel

Although Congress in the foreign aid authorization bill signed earlier this year imposed some controls over the Central Intelligence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislative branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that Agency for International Development funds intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guerrilla war in that country.

The record of CIA disdain for the will of Congress underscores the importance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security. Two former CIA officials, Dr. Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testifying for the bill, said the agency should provide Congress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

At present CIA briefings of Congress are provided only as sanctioned by the White House. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the military and political affairs of other countries suggest that it has arrogated to itself so many improper policy-making initiatives that the agency should be either be abolished or restricted by law to intelligence gathering alone.

11 April 1972

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STATINTL

Congress Seeks Facts On CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, April 11

CONGRESS CAN be gimlet-eyed when looking at welfare projects, but thus far has played the doting, indulgent parent if cloak-and-dagger work is afoot. It is bad form for a legislator to inquire as to how many billions the intelligence agencies are getting, or ask for a peek at what they find out.

That is changing. Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, appears to be making good progress with his proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency make available to Congress what it knows about matters relating to foreign countries and the national security.

Proponents of the Cooper bill say it will prevail because the existing situation does not make sense. Congress needs light to make its decisions. Why should Congress be ignorant of facts and analyses assembled by the United States at great cost?

Congress now operates in the dark. As Cooper noted when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings March 28, the foreign intelligence information developed by the CIA and other agencies is available only to President Richard M. Nixon and the Executive Branch, as a matter of law.

"I contend that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security—which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation—should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people," Cooper said.

SENATOR COOPER'S proposal would amend the National Security Act of 1947, under which the CIA was established. There is a precedent for what he wants to do, in that Congress required in 1946 that its joint Committee on Atomic Energy be kept fully informed of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, a federal agency.

It was remarked at the hearings by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, a member of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees, that he had been unable to obtain nuclear information as a member of those committees. He became a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last spring.

"I learned more about the true strength of the United States in six days in Europe about this time last year than I did in my previous 18 years as a member of the Armed Services Committee," Symington said.

Testimony by Cooper and Symington gave Senators an opportunity to complain

about the Defense Department's habit of reporting a new Russian "threat" at the time the Pentagon's money bill is going through Congress. Congress, some Senators complained, is asked to take these so-called threats on faith.

"We all know," said Senator George D. Aiken (Rep.), Vermont, "that when the appropriations bill is pending, the Russians in particular become extremely powerful..."

THE COOPER BILL gave the public insight into the curious procedure under which, for security reasons members of the Senate and House are asked to vote on multibillion-dollar defense issues—including the funds to be spent on intelligence—without being able to know what they are doing.

For example, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and others are said to cost up to six billion dollars a year, but nobody in the Senate except five senior members of the Appropriations Committee is privy to the amount of money spent. Mammoth sums are hidden in the federal budget.

Senator Symington tried unsuccessfully late last November to put a four billion dollar annual ceiling on outlays of the CIA, NSA, DIA and military intelligence activities. He was defeated 31 to 56. Symington told the Senate he had tried to get information about intelligence outlays from the Appropriations Committee staff, but it was denied him.

This was called by Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, "a shocking and unprecedented situation."

Senator Cooper's bill would not throw light on intelligence-gathering costs but would di-

rect the CIA to make available "facts and analyses" to Senate and House committees dealing with foreign relations and the armed services. The CIA reports would include material produced by all agencies.

WHAT COOPER and his associates want, as a practical matter, is the same basic intelligence that is disseminated to the White House, the Pentagon and other branches of Government. They do not want to be fed tidbits carefully selected by persons who may have an axe to grind.

Vast sums have been voted by Congress to buy weapons systems that insiders maintained were essential to counter perils that turned out to be illusory. Critics of such spending want to be able to question the CIA, which has the reputation of putting out sound and honest reports.

Among witnesses who have testified favorably on the Cooper bill are Adam Yarmolinsky of Harvard Law School, a former assistant secretary of defense, and Herbert Scoville Jr., former director of science and technology for the CIA.

"IT SEEMS TO ME," Yarmolinsky said March 30, "it is rather inappropriate for the Congress of the United States to be in the position of the schoolboy who is lectured by his instructors rather than in the position of the graduate student who is able to go into the library and look up the sources."

Scoville noted that the CIA frequently briefed congressional committees but said this was not so satisfactory, in his opinion, as the situation would be if the CIA had a legal duty to keep Congress informed. He pointed out that measures must be taken to safeguard the information.

"I believe the regularized provision of national intelligence to the Congress by the CIA would improve security," he said, "not compromise it."

In the House, a companion bill to Cooper's has been introduced by Representative Paul Findley (Rep.), Illinois.

STATINTL

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its first major setback because it failed in its attempt to overthrow Castro. At the top of the agency's hierarchy was the committee, which included the director, the administration, the agency's legal counsel, and the agency's public relations. Throughout the 1960s, the agency's operations against Cuba continued at the same time, and the agency was deeply involved in operations against regimes in Laos and

When the Nation exposed the CIA in 1967, the agency's labor and cultural funding conduits, he tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's control over the CIA. He was simply told by P and get on with it. He formed to look into Secretary of State, the of the CIA. Some because they had been longer thought worth continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

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Access by Hill To CIA Data Recommended

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two former senior employees of the Central Intelligence Agency urged yesterday that selected congressional committees be provided regularly with CIA information and analysis concerning U.S. foreign relations and "matters of national security."

The ex-CIA men, Chester L. Cooper and Herbert Scoville Jr., testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing convened to discuss a bill introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to amend the National Security Act of 1947.

The bill, a variation of previous congressional efforts to supervise the U.S. intelligence community, calls for the CIA to "inform fully and currently" the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives as well as the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

Speaking in defense of his proposal, Sen. Cooper said that it "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel."

Its main purpose, the senator explained, is to give Congress "access to all available information and intelligence" so that the legislature can "discharge properly and morally its responsibility."

The Nixon administration has voiced its hostility to the bill in a State Department letter sent in January to Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, saying that requiring the CIA to inform Congress is "incompatible" with the Secretary of State's role as principal foreign policy adviser to the President.

The State Department letter, described by Fulbright as "the worst I have ever seen," also said that an obligation for the CIA to brief

Congress "would raise a constitutional question as to separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches."

Chester Cooper, 55, a veteran of the CIA, the State Department and the White House who now works for the Institute of Defense Analyses, recommended yesterday that a special staff of "carefully" chosen officers serve as liaison men between the CIA and the congressional committees.

He warned against Congress demanding access to all intelligence studies, saying that "the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered daily to the Senate and House mailroom."

The former CIA employee therefore suggested that Congress be authorized to receive the National Security Study Memoranda, an eclectic set of documents that contain a wide array of information and interpretation of current policy options.

The other committee witness, Scoville, 57, formerly the CIA's Director of Science and Technology, asserted that the administration has deliberately misused intelligence in its presentations to Congress to promote its own legislation.

Scoville alleged that administration spokesmen in 1969 sought to justify the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program before Congress by reporting that the Soviet Union would soon acquire a "first-strike capability" that demanded endorsement of the U.S. program.

Disputing the administration argument that intelligence briefings raise a "Constitutional question," Scoville said that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee function in the realm of nuclear developments for years.

Both former CIA men cautioned the committee against having Congress provide the public with information given to its committees by the intelligence community.

Sourcees close to the committee also expressed fears privately that any intention on the part of Congress to release CIA intelligence to the public might result in the defeat of the bill.

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A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.
2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.
4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."
5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."


In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation, and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:





The New York Times/Nancy Moran

LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to Long Tieng, a base operated by the Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported by C.I.A.

First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The controls, which thus far have attracted little public attention, are the first to be added since Congress created the agency through the National Security Act of 1947, a measure that was amended in 1949.

This act exempts the C.I.A. from most fiscal and personnel controls imposed on other federal agencies. Funds, personnel and material voted by Congress to other agencies, such as the Defense Department, can, for example, be switched legally to the C.I.A.

The controls were inserted at various points in the aid bill largely through the ef-

forts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri.

They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Together with the committee's Chairman, J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, they have protested increasingly in recent months that Congress has too little knowledge of, let alone control over, the agency's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Senator Case urged on July 12 a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other United States agencies. Mr. Case insisted that the C.I.A. be included in the restrictions lest United States involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

Laos. "would prevent the cir-

cumvention of Congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through C.I.A. rather than through more open Government agencies."

"It would also," he said, "eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using C.I.A. personnel."

Stennis Their Irritant

The ire of the committee members is reported to be less against the C.I.A. itself than against Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and of the so-called "Oversight" Committee for the agency. The Oversight Committee comprises senior members of the Armed Services

and Appropriations committees plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is supposed to watch over all the agency's activities.

Under Senator Stennis's direction, however, it did not meet at all in 1971—to the annoyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activities around the world intimately and sometimes decisively affect the conduct of United States foreign policy.

They have now moved to bypass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congressional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes.

Specifically, according to legislative specialists, the new controls will require the following actions:

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THE CIA: A VISIBLE GOVERNMENT IN INDOCHINA

Fred Branfman and Steve Cohn
New York, N.Y.

STATINTL

"The CIA may or may not be an invisible government here at home ... but to those close to the war it is one of the most visible — and important — governments in Indo-China today."

STATINTL

As American soldiers are withdrawn from Indochina, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) is increasing. The C.I.A. may or may not be an invisible government here at home. But to those close to the war, it is one of the most visible — and important — governments in Indochina today.

CIA Secret Army

As we shall explain further in weeks to come, the C.I.A.'s budget in Laos and Cambodia exceeds those of the Laotian and Cambodian Governments by 20 or 30 to 1; the C.I.A. recruits, supplies, and directs a polyglot "Secret Army" of 100,000 men that does most of the front-line fighting in these two nations; C.I.A. photo interpreters and intelligence operatives control targetting, the most important part of the air war; C.I.A. political operatives are the main day-to-day intermediaries between the U.S. Government and local Lao and Cambodian politicians and generals.

And, of course, normal espionage, sabotage, assassination, and extortion — the C.I.A.'s standard fare anywhere — continue as usual (see Pentagon Papers memos No. 15 and No. 22 for Colonel Lansdale's descriptions of such activities as long as 10 and 20 years ago.)

In South Viet Nam, the C.I.A. role is also rising. The "pacification" program has taken on greater importance under Richard Nixon, and this of course is under the direct control of the C.I.A. through the deputy ambassador for pacification, always a C.I.A. man.

Phoenix Project

The key aspect of pacification is the Phoenix Project, an admitted program of murder and torture of civilians suspected to be working for the National Liberation Front. Since Phoenix's inception, it openly admitted that the C.I.A. has killed and abducted more civilians than even the U.S. Government claims have been similarly mistreated by "Viet Cong terrorists" (see accompanying chart).

In discussing the role of the C.I.A. in Indochina today, let us note at the outset that this is not an aberration: the C.I.A. devotes most of its budget

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and personnel to waging political and military warfare in all corners of the globe, with only a small percentage going into strict intelligence-gathering.

Carefully Cultivated Myth

This is not generally known, of course, for one of the most carefully cultivated myths in America today is that the C.I.A.'s main job is to prepare intelligence estimates for the President — the only job it is legally mandated to perform.

Whether in a recent Newsweek cover story on C.I.A. chief Richard Helms, or in a speech by Helms himself to an association of newspaper editors earlier this year, the theme is constantly repeated that the C.I.A.'s major role is merely to provide estimates of things such as Russian missile strength or morale in North Viet Nam.

In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth.

Highly informed sources reveal that of 18,000 people employed directly by the C.I.A. today, no more than 2,000 are actually involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The vast majority are engaged in C.I.A. covert operations stretching from Bolivia to the Congo to Iran to Viet Nam.

Four Major Divisions

The C.I.A. is divided into four major divisions:

- (1) The DIRECTORATE OF PLANS (cover name for the division of covert operations or clandestine services) — 6,000 people;
- (2) The DIRECTORATE OF SUPPORT (the division providing logistics support to the Directorate of Plans) — 6,000 people;
- (3) The DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY — 4,000 people;
- (4) The DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE — 2,000 people.

Thus fully two thirds of the C.I.A.'s direct-hire employees — and a far higher percentage of its estimated two- to six-billion dollar budget — go to waging political and/or military warfare.

The China Scholars and U.S. Intelligence

STATINTL

by David Horowitz

BEFORE ACTUALLY BOARDING AIR FORCE ONE for his February meeting with Chairman Mao, Richard Nixon will be forced to run a gauntlet of intelligence briefing sessions designed to bring him up to date on the latest Chinese developments. The cram course on contemporary China, programmed by CIA director Richard C. Helms, will range from an elementary Who's Who in the Chinese government and questions of unfamiliar proletarian protocol—e.g., What should Pat Nixon say to Mme. Mao, the militant leader of the Peking Red Guards?—to more esoteric information not generally found in either the *New York Times* or the *Peking People's Daily* Sunday Supplement. More or less hard answers to questions like "Whatever happened to Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's ex-close-comrade-in-arms?" "What progress are Chinese rocket experts making with their long range missile systems?" "How do the factions within the People's Army and Communist Party line up in the present leadership struggle?"

In order to provide Nixon with the data he needs on this trip, Helms is able to cull the output of hundreds of military and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio transmissions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptographers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese military, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert operators in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily suborning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley, Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is another intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely articulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institutions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions are more apparent than real, for what we have in China studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and directed an entire academic field, providing at last a definitive answer to the age-old question: "Who shall educate the educators?"

[AN INTELLIGENCE WHO'S WHO]

FOLLOWING THE MC CARTHY FREEZEOUT China scholars began to come in from the cold in the early Kennedy years. Something of the origins of the American China scholar intelligence network that subsequently developed can be gleaned from a private letter written in 1962 by the head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), Dr. Allen Whiting. This letter, made available by its recipient, who at that time was the head of Berkeley's Center for China Studies, aimed to recruit him to the BIR's "elite project." Who was going to take over after Chairman Mao?, the BIR wanted to know. "Experience with post-Stalin Russia," Whiting wrote, "has shown the importance of anticipating succession crises in communist countries and especially of understanding the significance of their outcome in terms of changes in communist policy." American intelligence had already sifted *prima facie* evidence suggesting conflicts within the Chinese leadership. Whiting complained, however, that inadequate attention to the make-up of the factions "has left us with no firm picture of attitudes held by competing groups on such

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Psychological Warfare

Psychological operations during war and peace haven't exactly been an American strong point.

This weakness became sharply apparent during the Vietnam War.

Barry Zorthian discussed "The Use of Psychological Operations" in the book "Lessons Of Vietnam" published by the American-Asian Educational Exchange.

Zorthian feels we have run into difficulty in using the "whole process of communication in a wartime situation" because we believe strongly in the separation of military and political roles; in the concept of an open society; and that propaganda and other psychological tools are "dirty tactics."

He contends that once we recognize the reality of combined political/military effort in foreign countries; that there are no societies as open as ours and that psychological warfare is not dirty pool, we will begin to progress more rapidly in this important area.

Zorthian says the necessary ingredients of successful psychological operations include: a voice in determining governmental policies; communicating reality; adjusting to various audiences; speaking through the "host" government;

and complete functional integrity with no compartmentalization. He claims we lack experience in this field—and he is correct.

Amrom H. Katz takes this approach into the proposed formation of the National Independence Support Agency (NISA) in the book "Southeast Asian Perspectives" published by American Friends of Vietnam, Inc. NISA is a development on the CIA international functions—only it is more direct and functional as a counterinsurgency operation against "wars of national liberation." NISA, Katz claims, would be the focus of US efforts to collect data on current experiences in Vietnam for instance, and to retrieve, before it is too late, data from past experience. It could also conduct and sponsor research in this field etc. . . .

Despite considerable CIA activity (which are unable to measure) we have obviously not countered, with any great effectiveness, the subversive, political thrusts of international communism. We are learning swiftly that economic levers and military adventures have led us down some bloody, dark roads. It is time we used our imagination and innovativeness in the development of psychological operations.

DES MOINES, IOWA
TRIBUNE

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Spy Competition

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has 90 agents overseas and plans to add six more. Is J. Edgar Hoover trying for an International Bureau of Investigation?

Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak say Hoover had to promise the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (which have a primary duty of gathering intelligence abroad) that FBI agents abroad would operate strictly under U.S. ambassadors. They will operate in the guise of "legal attaches" to embassies. The FBI is said to have agreed that it will not gather foreign intelligence, but just help apprehend fugitives from U.S. justice.

Evans and Novak assert, however, that FBI men do gather foreign intelligence and that they forward it directly to FBI headquarters, not through the ambassador. The intelligence the FBI gathers is mostly worthless gossip, according to intelligence agents from rival agencies.

Interagency wrangles among rival intelligence outfits are normal. The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 to bring some order into the situation — to co-ordinate the work of the various Defense and State Department intelligence agencies abroad, and leave the FBI to handle investigations of violations of federal laws at home — unless particular fields were assigned to other agencies, such as the Narcotics Bureau.

The Central Intelligence Agency was forbidden to do clandestine work inside the United States, but an expose-type book by David Wise and Thomas Ross ("The Espionage Establishment") asserted that the CIA violates this ban.

A recent Newsweek account of the shift of heroin smuggling in the last two years from French and Corsican smugglers to Latin American smugglers is based mainly upon FBI sources. So evidently the FBI has moved into narcotics, now, once reserved for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Co-operation and even competition between different federal agencies has its values sometimes, but aren't jurisdictional lines getting pretty snarled up? Are there no workable limits for the FBI and the CIA?

Did leak make CIA look good?

By DARRELL HANCOCK
Post Reporter

"Although it probably did not cross (Daniel) Ellsberg's mind when he released the Pentagon papers to the New York Times, he succeeded in doing what the (Central Intelligence) Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20 years: He made the CIA look good," writes Chester L. Cooper of the Institute for Defense Analysis in the January "Foreign Affairs."

In his article, "The CIA and Decision-making," Cooper describes the elite Office of National Estimates organized within the CIA in 1950. The small group of intelligence analysts prepares about 50 "estimates" annually on foreign policy problems, such as "Chinese communist nuclear capabilities as they may develop over the next several years..." An estimate is a projection, an opinion or a judgment, Cooper says, "but it is likely to be

the best-informed and most objective view the decision-maker can get."

Citing 13 items from the Pentagon papers, Cooper shows that the policy-makers were apparently warned again and again against the hope of easy U.S. military victory in Vietnam. The reservation "apparently" is necessary because, as Cooper admits, the selection of estimates by the writers and reporters of the Pentagon papers may have been highly selective. But the evidence at hand includes:

The Pentagon papers revealed that the government went on to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam ... but the CIA ... showed willingness to make (intelligence) estimates very much at variance with the current policy line.

- A 1954 report to the Eisenhower administration that "even with American support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the situation would probably continue to deteriorate."

The government went on to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, but Cooper says the CIA then and afterwards showed a willingness to make estimates "very much at variance with the current policy line."

- A 1961 warning to the fledgling Kennedy administration: Diem tolerated corruption and relied on one-man rule, casting doubt on his ability to lead the government.

- A later 1961 report that American military escalation in South Vietnam would be matched by similar escalation by Hanoi.


- A joint intelligence panel dissent in 1964 to the view that bombing would break Hanoi's will to continue the costly war.

- Repeated reports during the bombing that the North Vietnamese were continuing the war with "resolute stoicism" and with relatively unchanged strategy and material resources.

Events, to one degree or another, confirmed the "bearish" intelligence estimates, Cooper notes, wondering aloud how the "yawning gap" between the intelligence structure and the foreign policymakers could be closed.

Basically, he proposes face-to-face meetings between the two groups, possibly by putting the estimators within the National Security Council, which may have a stronger voice with the President. "Clearly if they are to play a more direct and useful role, the estimators must be brought out of their cloister into the real world."

But would the professorial estimators lose their prized objectivity in the quest for greater influence? Possibly, Cooper concedes. But if that issue can be resolved, a new intelligence arrangement "would make available what every President since Truman has said he wanted, but what none of them has been able to obtain on a routine basis — the best possible first-hand intelligence judgments on critical international problems."



THE BIGGEST SECRET SERVICE IN THE WORLD

Starting an exclusive report on the CIA, its power

INSIDE



The Biggest Secret Service in the World.
An analysis of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency begins on page 10.

The compiler of this three-part report is E. H. Cookridge (left), who is the author of 16 books on espionage. Recruited into the British Secret Service on graduating from the University of Vienna in 1934, he has spent his time ever since in intelligence work, or writing about it. "I am in the position of the dumb blonde in Hollywood films. Once you are it you cannot stop. I am tired of writing about spies." But his network of contacts built up over the years is unique; and ensures that he will be

STATINTL

THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

By Chester L. Cooper

"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."—"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and surrounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency." Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs débâcle, should adopt a somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned.

Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contributions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers.

Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. . . .¹ President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and especially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the 1950s and early 1960s.

To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American national security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory